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This Ph.D. dissertation investigates various areas in financial economics: market
microstructure, corporate finance, asset pricing, and financial econometrics. The
three comprising essays have a common ground: cross-border finance.
Chapter One documents the impact of differential private information on
relative asset pricing across borders by studying the probability of informed
trading (PIN) for Canadian shares traded on exchanges separated by Niagara
Falls. Relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Toronto Stock Ex-
change (TSX) has more informed trades and accounts for a larger information
share, indicating that informed traders contribute to cross-border price discov-
ery. The information imbalance across the two markets is associated with small
but positive price premiums for New York trades. The dynamics of these pre-
miums depends on trade informedness. Lastly, the PIN of a TSX-listed share
typically rises upon cross-listing on the NYSE, which is consistent with negative
abnormal returns of the original listing.
The theory of corporate governance suggests that managers of poorly gov-
erned firms are more likely to make poor investment decisions, and the evi-
dence on high antitakeover provision (ATP) firms is consistent. In Chapter Two,
I study the effect of domestic and foreign takeovers by U.S. firms and find that
high-ATP bidders tend to pay relatively high premiums for either targets. While
this suggests that these firms make poor decisions, high-ATP bidders also ex-
perience relatively high event study returns at times of foreign takeover news.
This contradicts the findings of Masulis et al. (2007) for domestic takeovers.
Finally, Chapter Three explores the convergence between the prices of Amer-
ican Depositary Receipts (ADRs) listed by Asia-Pacific firms and their original
shares listed on home exchanges. Instead of relying on conventional paramet-
ric approaches that carry embedded model-specification errors, I contribute to
the literature by introducing a nonparametric technique to estimate the conver-
gence speed parameter. I present the time-varying characteristics of both firm
and country-level convergence speed parameters. Furthermore, I empirically
verify and visually corroborate the comparative dynamics of convergence with
respect to short sales restrictions, trading time differences, and market-tier mea-
sures proxied by the Morgan Stanley Capital International indices. I conclude
that enhancement in market efficiency accelerates the reversion to the parity of
ADR-pairs.
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CHAPTER 1
A TRANS-NIAGARA TALE OF INFORMED TRADERS
1.1 Introduction
Canada and the United States are among the most integrated economies in the
world and share comparable accounting standards and institutions. Can in-
formation asymmetry explain cross-border pricing effects for Canadian shares
listed in both Canadian and U.S. equity markets? This research begins by show-
ing how dominance in private information in one market can yield a positive
premium1 in the other market. Empirical tests relate information asymmetry to
the level and dynamics of these premiums, and to cross-listing announcement
effects. The probability of informed trading (PIN) proves itself to be an effective
tool for revealing “how information is priced” in stock trading dispersed across
the border, across time, and beyond the initial cross-listing event.
Over the past several decades, many firms have listed their common shares
on exchanges outside their home country. According to the World Federation of
Exchanges, as of 2005, the global market capitalization of stocks listed outside
their home country by 2,636 foreign companies amounted to U.S.$5.76 trillion,
an increase of 16.3% from 2004. In the U.S. alone, almost 2,000 cross-listings2
1It is the relative premium of a cross-listed stock traded on a foreign exchange against the
home market share, adjusted by the exchange rate. January 1998 through December 2000, the
ten-minute frequency relative premium for 56 pairs of Canadian stocks traded on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) has arithmetic mean, median,
and standard deviation of 0.00306, 0.00004, and 0.03031 respectively (Panel A of Table A.2). The
term “cross-listing premium” defined by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) is the excess value
of foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. relative to those not in terms of Tobin’s (1969) q ratio.
2This includes Levels I & II Depositary Receipts (DRs), Level I over-the-Counter (OTC) DRs,
Rule 144a private placement DRs, ordinary shares, and Global Registered Shares (GRSs). See
Bank of New York’s (2006) The Depositary Receipt Markets.
1
were recorded. By September 2005, the total value of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) reached U.S.$657 billion, an increase of 36% over the preced-
ing twelve months. The popularity of international cross-listings has prompted
many publications on this subject, most of which focus on the benefits of cross-
border listings. See Karolyi (2006) for an excellent survey.
Cross-listing is a cross-border version of “fragmentation.”3 Consequently,
the same questions asked of domestically fragmented trading also arise with
international cross-listing.4 If a stock lists on both home and foreign exchanges,
where does price information originate and where does price discovery take
place? What is the dynamic relationship between the two? Do both markets
reflect the same fundamental values? Does the trading of identical stocks in
two distinct markets reveal the same information on the company?
Hasbrouck (1995) confirms that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) dom-
inates other regional exchanges in contributing to price discovery: order pur-
chase agreements may seek to divert small retail trades to regional locations
but leave the larger and potentially more information-based trades to the NYSE.
When a non-U.S. stock lists on the NYSE, the host exchange may no longer be the
overwhelming source of new information being collected about the cross-listed
pair. On the other hand, trades on the non-U.S. home exchange can be more
influential if more information (either private or public) is traded in the home
market.
In this paper, I study the trading of Canadian shares listed on the NYSE, along
with their original listings on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). The Canadian
3In the market microstructure literature, fragmentation refers to domestic multi-marketing
trading of a stock listing.
4Previous studies on “intra-border” fragmentation include Hasbrouck (1995) and Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996).
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shares traded in the U.S. are identical to those traded at home in terms of div-
idends, voting rights, and other characteristics, and can be bought and sold on
either market. Furthermore, the U.S. and Canadian economies are highly inte-
grated, implying identical costs of capital and identical stock prices in both mar-
kets. While a positive but small relative premium in New York trading (Panel
A of Table A.2) is not likely to yield consistent arbitrage profits after consider-
ing bid-ask spreads and other trading costs, it may, as we shall see, reveal the
impact of private information in interesting and useful ways.
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004, 2009a) document
price differentials between Canadian cross-listings in the U.S. and their origi-
nal listings in Canada. By extension, my theoretical arguments and empirical
results show that information asymmetry that varies across the border, firms,
and time manifests itself in relative pricing of Canadian cross-listed pairs on the
NYSE and the TSX. The PIN on a stock proxies for the proportion of informed
transactions among all trades in a particular market. Following Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), I individually estimate PIN for both the TSX and
NYSE trading of each cross-listed pair.
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) note that, in equilibrium, a high-PIN
stock carries an adverse-selection discount. Similarly, I reason that a non-zero
price gap arises between New York and Toronto trades if one market features
relatively more private information. Building on the noisy rational expectations
model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), I show that a higher-PIN TSX-listed stock
must trade at a lower price than on the NYSE in a no-arbitrage equilibrium given
a sufficient condition of “home market liquidity dominance.” Put another way,
a price discount is needed to induce buyers to trade in the market which is more
3
likely to be plagued by informed traders.
Hasbrouck’s (1995) “information share” is a relative measure of the contri-
bution made by a particular stock exchange to price discovery when trade in an
asset is dispersed across multiple domestic sites. This idea is also valid beyond
the border. The exchange with a higher proportion of informed traders (PIN) is
expected to lead the other market in cross-border price discovery, reflected in
a higher information share. Given a “Trans-Niagara” imbalance in asymmetric
information, a slightly higher NYSE price is sensible. The volatility of the rela-
tive premiums in New York (Panel A of Table A.2) can attract arbitrageurs. In
turn, the degree to which arbitrage pushes NYSE and TSX prices to converge to
parity can be measured by the convergence speed parameter of Gagnon and
Karolyi (2004). I relate the estimated convergence speed to trade informedness
(PIN) in order to explain the dynamics of cross-border arbitrage returns.
Cross-listing appears to affect the home exchange in a number of dimen-
sions. Foerster and Karolyi (1998) report that, on average, the bid-ask spread
narrows on the TSX upon a cross-listing in New York. The original listings also
experience negative abnormal returns upon cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi
(1999)). Given that fewer noise trades occur in the market with lower trading
costs (Eun and Sabherwal (2003)), a higher proportion of informed traders on
the TSX is likely after a cross-listing on the NYSE. This prediction deserves due
attention because the PIN is a risk factor in determining asset returns.
Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003), I choose to study Canadian stocks
listed in the U.S. for several reasons. First, Canadian equities are the largest
group of stocks cross-listed in the U.S. from a single country. Thus, a large
cross-section that holds the nationality of the shares constant is available for
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study. Second, many of these Canadian stocks trade actively on both the NYSE
and the TSX which is essential for conducting intraday tests. Third, the trading
hours of the TSX coincide with that of the NYSE (9:30AM—4:00PM, EST), a dis-
tinct advantage for studying Canadian stocks relative to those from Europe and
Asia with little or no overlap in trading times between home and U.S. markets.
Since the potential noise and bias from trading-time differences are eliminated,
analyses based on information asymmetry are more reliable. Finally, Canadian
stocks trade in the U.S. as ordinary shares due to compatible accounting stan-
dards, whereas most other cross-listed shares are ADRs issued by U.S. custodian
banks. This implies that arbitrage between the U.S. and Canada is particularly
simple as it is not necessary to create or destroy depositary receipts (DRs).
The main empirical findings of my study are as follows. First, relative to the
NYSE, the TSX has denser population of informed traders (higher in PIN) and
typically accounts for more of the measured information share. This is explicit
evidence of the informed traders’ contribution to cross-border price discovery,
confirming Eun and Sabherwal’s (2003) finding. The reason for using the PIN
to proxy for information asymmetry is that its cross-border difference is central
in relative pricing of cross-listings. Per the extended version of Grossman and
Stiglitz’s (1980) noisy rational expectations model presented in Section 2, hav-
ing relatively better liquidity (lower in relative quoted spread) on the TSX pro-
vides an empirical support for the sufficient condition to give rise to an, overall,
slightly positive premium on the NYSE-listing against its original TSX-listing.
A higher PIN on one exchange reflects a larger proportion of informed traders
who have a better understanding of the firm. However, this is likely to be the
result of institutional background of the TSX where insider trading was more
feasible due to delayed prosecution by the authority (King and Segal (2004)).
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Nonetheless, the exchange with relatively more informed traders is more likely
to generate relevant information that stokes price discovery in both markets.
Second, the tendency of pairs of prices to converge appears to be fostered
by discretionary liquidity traders. This novel finding is among a few articles
in the literature relating the dynamics of premiums and discounts on pairs of
cross-listed shares to information asymmetry.5 It turns out that lower-PIN pairs
converge more rapidly to parity, perhaps because arbitrageurs avoid informed
traders, trading with “non-discretionary” liquidity traders instead. Thus, a low
PIN on a pair with a quickly vanishing premium reflects active participation of
discretionary liquidity traders. Pairs trades can be done without private infor-
mation on the issuers of diverged stocks as timely execution and unwinding of
positions suffice.6
Finally, the PIN on a TSX-listed stock, on average, rises upon cross-listing on
the NYSE. In other words, the information asymmetry surrounding the issuer on
its home exchange intensifies once it cross-lists away from home.7 This increase
in adverse selection is consistent with a finding of negative abnormal returns on
the TSX upon cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi (1999)). The managers of Cana-
dian firms may have been led to trade on inside information upon cross-listings
that resulted in undermining their existing shareholder values. This is a mild
contradiction to Coffee’s (1999) bonding hypothesis which posits that manage-
rial incentives of cross-listing firms are aligned with shareholders’ interests.
5Gagnon and Karolyi (2009a) find that, controlling for various proxies of information asym-
metry, holding costs of long-short portfolios of cross-listed pairs significantly explain the cross-
sectional and time-series variation in price parity deviations.
6Statistical arbitrage, or pairs trade, is a risk-taking trading strategy on a pair of assets whose
price difference is expected to diminish over a relatively short holding period. It contrasts with
a true risk-free, pure arbitrage in which one simultaneously submits and settles buy and sell
orders on both exchanges.
7This finding provides an answer to the open question mentioned in the conclusion of
Halling et al. (2008).
6
These three key results effectively address “how information asymmetry
is priced” in stock trading that is fragmented across a border, over time, and
around cross-listing events. The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. First, Section 2 shows the existence of a positive relative premium with an
extended version of Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) model. Section 3 presents
key hypotheses based on the existing literature. Section 4 describes the data
and exhibits preliminary results. Section 5 provides my main empirical results.
I conclude in Section 6.
1.2 Extended Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) note that, in equilibrium, a high-
probability of informed trading (PIN) stock carries an adverse-selection discount
since it requires an additional return.8 Similarly, I reason that, for a cross-listed
pair, the cross-listing yields a positive relative premium9 if the original home-
listing carries heavier private information. For a Canadian company that trades
it at pT > 0 on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), its cross-listing decision on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) creates a replica that trades at pN > 0 with the
same underlying fair value, adjusted for the exchange rate.
Formally, a cross-listing event gives rise to a relative premium in the cross-
listing, κ ≡ pN/pT − 1 ≷ 0, then pN = pT + α (piT − piN) for some α > 0, where
piT and piN are the respective proportions of informed traders on the TSX and the
NYSE whose empirical proxies are the exchange-specific PINs. Thus, the relative
8See Appendix A.3 for derivation of the PIN.
9I use the term “relative premium” as the relative premium of a cross-listed stock on a foreign
exchange against its home market share, adjusted by the exchange rate.
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premium is determined as follows: κ =
(
α
pT
)
(piT − piN) ≷ 0 for piT ≷ piN.
Following the noisy rational expectations model introduced by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), informed traders and uninformed traders have respective
proportions on their own exchanges of pii and (1 − pii), where i = T(SX),N(YSE).
Arbitrageurs do not have an a priori proportion on either exchange in a “no-
arbitrage” equilibrium. Informed traders and uninformed traders share the
same constant relative risk aversion (CARA) utility function with a risk aver-
sion coefficient (ρ) or a risk tolerance parameter (η ≡ 1/ρ). Arbitrageurs are
risk-neutral.
The future earnings (υ) of the firm is uncertain, υ ∼ N
(
υ, σ2υ
)
. Informed
traders recognize a signal S about υ with random noise s ∼ N
(
0, σ2s
)
, such that
S = υ + s. The exchange-specific aggregate supply of shares is Yi ∼ N
(
yi, σ
2
i
)
and is proportionately driven by uninformed (noise) traders. For convenience,
all variances are expressed in precision terms in the following discussion: τυ ≡
1/σ2υ, τi ≡ 1/σ2i , and τs ≡ 1/σ2s .
Neither informed nor uninformed traders cross the Niagara Falls, and they
trade on their own exchanges. Informed traders on both exchanges receive the
same earnings signal, and they trade based on their updated expectations of
future earnings of the firm. Uninformed traders extract information from his-
torical price data only from their respective exchange. Their bias is reasonable
since uninformed investors cannot tell informativeness of prices so they only
refer to familiar listings. The two markets share the same risk-free asset with
a guaranteed net return of r which serves as the common opportunity cost of
capital.
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Arbitrageurs can buy and sell in both markets, and their demand only de-
pends on the relative premium, or discount. Specifically, their demand for one
side of the cross-listed pair (in order to shortsell) is given by xAi on each ex-
change, and it satisfies xAT +xAN = 0 since “pure” arbitrageurs use a perfect hedged
strategy. Thus, their short position on the TSX equals their long position on the
NYSE, µ ≡ xAT = −xAN.
Denote the surprises in the earnings signal and the exchange-specific sup-
ply of shares as ∆S ≡ S − S , and ∆Yi ≡ Yi − yi, respectively. The prices of the
cross-listed pair are bullish on a positive earnings shock (∆S > 0), and bearish
on positive liquidity excesses (∆Yi > 0) and shortsells (xAi > 0) on respective
exchanges. Thus, the prices on the TSX and the NYSE are conjectured to be:
pT = β0T + β
S
T ∆S − βYT ∆YT − βAT xAT ,
pN = β0N + β
S
N∆S − βYN∆YN − βANxAN.
Informed traders in the two markets observe the same private signal S and
use it to update their beliefs. Upon receiving a new earnings signal, their up-
dated (posterior) earnings forecast (E (υ|S )) and updated earnings forecast pre-
cision (τ (υ|S )) are given by
E (υ|S ) = υ +
(
τs
τs + τυ
)
∆S ,
τ (υ|S ) ≡ 1
Var (υ|S ) = τs + τυ.
Under the CARA utility function assumption, exchange-specific informed
traders’ demand for shares is
xIi (pi, S ) =
E (υ|S ) − pi (1 + r)
ρVar (υ|S )
= η (τs + τυ)
{
υ +
(
τs
τs + τυ
)
∆S − pi (1 + r)
}
.
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Uninformed traders observe prices on their respective exchanges and form
their expectations of future earnings. Their price-contingent updated (poste-
rior) earnings forecast (E (υ|pi)), updated earnings precision (τ (υ|pi)) and de-
mand function are, respectively, given by
E (υ|pi) = υ +
(
1
βSi
) (
φiτs
φiτs + τυ
)
∆pi,
τ (υ|pi) ≡ 1Var (υ|pi) =
(
τi
τi + h2i τs
)
τs + τυ,
xUi (pi) =
E (υ|pi) − pi(1 + r)
ρVar (υ|pi)
= η (φiτs + τυ)
{
υ +
(
1
βSi
) (
τs
τs + τυ
)
∆pi − pi (1 + r)
}
,
where hi ≡ βYi /βSi and φi ≡ τi/
(
τi + h2i τs
)
.
The market clearing condition on each exchange prescribes
pii xIi (pi, S ) + (1 − pii) xUi (pi, S ) = Yi − xAi .
Consequently, for a given arbitrageurs’ position (µ), solving the market-
clearing condition for the coefficients (β0i , β
S
i , β
Y
i , and β
A
i ) of conjectured prices
yields
β0i =
υ
1 + r
− yi
(1 + r)
(
ωIi + ω
U
i
) ,
βSi =
1
(1 + r)
(
ωIi + ω
U
i
) {ωIi ( τsτs + τυ
)
+ ωUi
(
φiτs
φiτs + τυ
)}
,
βYi =
ωIi {τs/(τ + τυ)}
(1 + r)
(
ωIi + ω
U
i
) {ωIi ( τsτs + τυ
)
+ ωUi
(
φiτs
φiτs + τυ
)}
,
βAi =
1
(1 + r)
(
ωIi + ω
U
i
) ,
10
where φi ≡ pi
2
i η
2 τs τi
1+pi2i η
2 τs τi
, ωIi ≡ pii η (τs + τυ), and ωUi ≡ (1 − pii) η (φiτs + τυ).10
In a no-arbitrage equilibrium (µ = ∆S = ∆YT = ∆YN = 0), the dollar premium
on the cross-listing is as follows.
pN − pT = β0N − β0T
=
yT
(1 + r) (ωIT + ω
U
T )
− yN
(1 + r) (ωIN + ω
U
N )
=
yT
(1 + r)ωT
− yN
(1 + r)ωN
=
ωN yT − ωT yN
(1 + r)ωT ωN
=
ωN
{
yT − (ωT/ωN)yN
}
(1 + r)ωT ωN
.
If piT > piN, then ωT ≡
(
ωIT + ω
U
T
)
> ωN ≡
(
ωIN + ω
U
N
)
, thus ωT/ωN > 1. With a
sufficient “home market liquidity dominance” condition that yT/yN > ωT/ωN >
1,11 the stock is dearer on the NYSE than on the TSX such that pN > pT. In other
words, as long as liquidity on the home exchange is relatively “better” than on
the host exchange, a higher proportion of informed traders on the home-listed
stock must give rise to a strictly positive relative premium in the cross-listed
stock. A price discount on the original listing is needed to induce buyers to
trade in the market which is more likely to be plagued by informed traders. This
premium on the cross-listing does not attract arbitrageurs and, thus, neither side
of the pair is mispriced.
If yT = yN, piT > piN implies pT > pN, which is consistent with Chan, Menkveld,
and Yang’s (2008) application to the Chinese A and B share markets. The no-
arbitrage condition in an equilibrium (∆S = ∆YT = ∆YN = 0) is pN − pT = β0N − β0T
10It can be shown that 1. ∂β0i (pii)/∂pii > 0 for all pii ∈ [0, 1]; 2. ∂βSi (pii)/∂pii > 0 for all pii ∈ [0, 1];
3. ∂βYi (pii)/∂pii < 0 for some large pii; and 4. ∂β
A
i (pii)/∂pii < 0 for all pii ∈ [0, 1]. ∂βSi (pii)/∂pii > 0 is
an intuitive result since the price is expected to reflect more information shocks with an increase
in the proportion of informed traders. See proofs in Appendix A.5.
11This sufficient condition is reasonable since the higher adverse-selection risk side of a cross-
listed pair is offering better liquidity, or facilitating easier exit, in addition to a commensurate
discount to attract investors.
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(see proof in Appendix A.5).
1.3 Hypotheses
Theoretically speaking, cross-border differential in private information can ex-
plain relative pricing of Canadian shares concurrently traded on the TSX and
the NYSE. I subsequently raise testable hypotheses of empirical support for the
institutional background of information asymmetry, the dynamics of relative
premiums, and the informational and economic consequences of cross-listings
on the home exchange.
1.3.1 Informed trading and cross-border price discovery
Unlike articles that focus on the joint distribution of trades and prices,12 Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997a, 1997b) and Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman
(1996) make parametric assumptions to estimate a relative measure of adverse
selection using buy and sell order indicators instead of price data. In their the-
oretical setting, there are risk-averse and competitive market makers, informed
traders, and uninformed (liquidity) traders.
The four parameters of the maximum likelihood model are: the probability
that an information event occurs on a given day (α); the probability that the
information event is pessimistic (δ); and the respective (Poisson) order arrival
rates of informed and uninformed traders (µ and η). As a result, the probability
12Bagehot (1971), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
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of informed trading13 (PIN) measures the relative degree of private information-
based trades among all trades. Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997b) argue that,
as informed traders gain weight in the market, adverse selection is aggravated
and the trading volume increases.
Fragmentation is the dispersal of trading in a security to multiple exchanges
or markets. As an early bridge between fragmentation and informed trading,
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) note that information lags between distinct trad-
ing locations yield transitory disparities in the prices of an identical security.
Blume and Goldstein (1991) and Lee (1993) report that price discovery (con-
vergence towards an equilibrium price) on U.S. exchanges occurs primarily on
the NYSE. Similar results are drawn by Harris, Mclnish, Shoesmith, and Wood
(1995) and Gardner and Subrahmanyam (1994).14
When a NYSE-listed stock trades not only on the NYSE but also on the re-
gional exchanges, the fragmented security prices may not be identical but they
also cannot differ too much in the long run either. Hasbrouck’s (1995) “informa-
tion share”15 is a relative measure of contribution made by a stock exchange to
price discovery of shares fragmented on multiple exchanges. Hasbrouck (1995)
finds that price discovery of fragmented stocks appears to be concentrated on
the NYSE whose information share is shown to be the highest.
13PIN ≡ αµ
αµ+2 η . See Appendix A.3.
14Extending the works of Hasbrouck (1991, 1995), Gardner and Subrahmanyam (1994) con-
clude that fewer informed trades are executed on the regional exchanges than on the NYSE.
15Information shares are estimated by the vector error correction model (ECM) provided that
the dispersed security prices are “cointegrated.” Security prices are cointegrated if there exists
a linear combination of the non-stationary prices that can be toned stationary. A time series
is strongly stationary if its probability distribution is time-invariant, and weakly stationary up
to its second moments: mean, variance, and covariance. This property renders Sims’s (1980)
original vector autoregressive (VAR) model unwieldy. That is why Hasbrouck (1995) takes an
ECM (Engle and Granger (1987), and Engle and Yoo (1987)) approach to propose “information
shares.” See Appendix A.4.
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Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) show that there is a significant difference
in the information content of orders executed in New York and in Cincinnati,
and that this difference is consistent with the “cream-skimming” hypothesis,
instead of the competition hypothesis. The notion that trades in distinct U.S.
locations carry different levels of information is also relevant to cross-border
fragmentation.
Extending the fragmentation idea to the international finance literature,
based on U.S.-listed Canadian stocks, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that prices
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and U.S. exchanges are mutually conver-
gent, following Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood (1995). They report that
the U.S. share of price discovery ranges from 0.2 percent to 98.2 percent, with
an average of 38.1 percent.
Across the global equity markets, Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2006) and Chan,
Menkveld, and Yang (2008) describe intriguing multi-board trading structures
in Thailand and China, respectively, and explain how information asymmetry
affects fragmented trading. Also, foreigners are disadvantaged in Korea (Choe,
Kho, and Stulz (2005)) while they wield superior information processing capa-
bility in Thailand and Singapore (Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2007)).
If a stock listed on an exchange has a higher PIN than its cross-listed stock
traded on the other cross-border exchange, this reflects a greater proportion of
informed traders who have private information of the issuer. Since informed
traders are believed to contribute to price discovery, it is also likely that the
exchange with heavier intensity of informed trades generates more relevant in-
formation which fosters price discovery.16
16Hasbrouck (2007) notes that a vector ECM analysis assigns quote changes to the influx of
trades. Asymmetric information is then reflected in a wide price change. In this sense, the
14
By definition, an exchange is said to lead the other exchange if it accounts
for more price discovery (reflected in its higher information share). However,
unlike domestically dispersed stocks, trades in TSX-NYSE cross-listed pairs are
exposed to aggregate shocks hitting the two exchanges and the foreign exchange
market. In other words, cross-border fragmentation is a more intricate mecha-
nism of price discovery than the domestic case. My first hypothesis attempts to
verify the role of informed traders in determining cross-border price discovery.
Specifically,
H1: compared to the other exchange, the lead market (with a higher aver-
age information share) has relatively more informed trades (with a higher
average PIN), and vice versa.
1.3.2 Dynamics of relative premiums
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) note that, in equilibrium, a high-PIN stock
carries an adverse-selection discount since it requires an additional return. Sim-
ilarly, as discussed in Section 2, I reason that a cross-listed pair yields either a
positive or negative relative premium17 if one side carries relatively more pri-
vate information.18 Unless that relative price spread is believed to persist due
to severe liquidity constraints, shortsale restrictions, or other frictions, an arbi-
trageur will buy the discounted stock and short the other side with favorable
information share is expected to be directionally equivalent to the PIN.
17This as defined as the relative premium of a cross-listed stock on a U.S. exchange against its
home market basis share, adjusted by the exchange rate.
18In Section 2, based on an extended version of the noisy rational expectations model (Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980)), I provide a sufficient condition (“home market liquidity dominance”)
under which a higher-PIN TSX-listed stock must be priced lower than its NYSE-listed replica in
a “no-arbitrage” equilibrium.
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assumptions on the exchange rate.
The international finance literature has accumulated articles on arbitrage op-
portunities created by cross-listed shares. The early studies (Maldonado and
Saunders (1983), Kato, Linn, and Schallheim (1991), Park and Tavakkol (1994),
Miller and Morey (1996), and Karolyi and Stulz (1996)) conclude that arbitrage
profits for cross-listed shares do not exist and thus they are priced at parity.
Wahab, Lashgari, and Cohn (1992) show that there are arbitrage opportunities
in cross-listed pairs. Froot and Dabora (1999) study pricing of a couple of dual-
listed corporations (Royal Dutch and Shell, and Unilever N.V. and Unilever PLC)
and find a sizable and significant price deviation from parity.19
Gagnon and Karolyi (2009a) record significant price deviations in 506 cross-
listed pairs under their study: they report discounts of up to 40.4% and premi-
ums of up to 127.4%. The speed at which a relative premium converges to parity
is measured by a parameter proposed by Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). Accord-
ing to their empirical model each firm’s relative premium can be explained by
its first-lag term, and its time-distributed risk exposure to the respective returns
on the home and host market indices and the foreign exchange rate.20
19See Kim, Szakmary, and Mathur (2000) for vector autoregressive (VAR) and seemingly un-
related estimation (SURE) methods that analyze adjustments in ADR-implied prices.
20For each cross-listed pair (i), SPEEDCONV (≡ θi) measures the reciprocal speed of the parity-
convergence of relative premium, following Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2004) empirical model:
DRi(t) = αi + θi DRi(t − 1) +
1∑
j=−1
βUSj R
US
M (t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βCj R
C
M(t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βFXj RFX(t + j) + εi(t).
The daily relative premium
(
DRi(t) ≡
(
PUSi (t) − PCi (t)
)
/PCi (t)
)
can be explained by 1. its own lag
(DRi(t − 1)) associated with 2. the convergence speed parameter (θi): the closer the absolute value to
zero, the faster the convergence to parity; and lag-distributed (yesterday ( j = −1), today ( j = 0),
and tomorrow ( j = +1)) returns on 3. the S&P 500 Index
(
RUSM (t + j)
)
, 4. the S&P TSX Composite
Index
(
RCM(t + j)
)
, and 5. the Canada-U.S. exchange rate return (RFX(t + j)), a positive RFX implies
a depreciation in the Canadian dollar. The forward-lag is due to information leakages and
market impact.
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In a rational expectations equilibrium, informed investors impound infor-
mation in prices (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) and, thus, catalyze price discov-
ery. In the cross-section, a higher PIN implies enhanced price discovery. Hence,
for the “synchronous” relative premium of a Canada-U.S. cross-listed pair, its
dynamics (convergence speed) is expected to depend on the informedness of
trades, after controlling for market friction, liquidity constraint, and firm char-
acteristics. Parity-convergence can, therefore, be accelerated by the degree of
private information on the cross-lister. In this regard, my second conjecture
states that
H2: the higher the PIN on a cross-listed pair, the faster the parity-
convergence of relative premiums.21
1.3.3 Cross-listing effects on the home exchange
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) argue that, since noise traders
do not reflect information on the fundamentals their trades dislocate prices from
their intrinsic values, reducing price informativeness while increasing volatility
(noise trader risk). Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley
(1996), and Jones and Seguin (1997) suggest that less noise trades occur in the
markets with lower trading costs.
Foerster and Karolyi (1998) document that post-cross-listing spreads in
Canada decrease. The augmented liquidity gives rise to TSX market makers’
competitive reaction by setting bid-ask spreads lower.22 The bid-ask spread
21By specification, a lower absolute value of parameter below one is equivalent to a higher
convergence speed.
22The decrease in spreads on the TSX is heavily weighed on the stocks whose trading volume
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represents a significant portion in transaction costs, thus cross-listings can re-
duce noise trader risk on the home exchange. This, in turn, may enhance price
discovery, since less noisy fluctuation contributes to setting a more precise and
stable process towards the fair price of a security.
A subsequent question will be: “whether less volatility entails a higher pro-
portion of informed trades?” Further, “does cross-listing exacerbate the home
market information environment with relatively more grave adverse selection?”
The reason for focusing a cross-listing effect on the PIN, as a proxy information
asymmetry, is that it serves as a risk factor in relative pricing of cross-listed
pairs. My last hypothesis is that
H3: after cross-listing on the NYSE, on average, information asymmetry
on a TSX-listed stock intensifies (the PIN rises).
Cross-listings can be a good source of additional liquidity to the existing
home-listed stocks. Intensifying adverse selection captured by the PIN and in-
creasing trading volume are positively correlated (Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara
(1997b)) and this further leverages my hypothesis. The additional liquidity on
the TSX forces market makers to set spreads narrower. See Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) for a similar discussion.
contribution by the U.S. exchanges is relatively large.
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1.4 Data and preliminary results
1.4.1 Data
56 TSX-NYSE pairs are identified through the sample period: January 1, 1998,
through December 31, 2000.23 In order to conduct microstructure analyses, high-
frequency data are required for the shares co-listed on the TSX and the NYSE, and
the U.S.-Canada exchange rate. Accordingly, the tick-by-tick trade and quote
data for the TSX-listed Canadian stocks and the Trade-And-Quote (TAQ) data of
their cross-listings on the NYSE through the period are used. The exchange rate
intraday data is purchased from Olson & Associates.
Unlike a specialist-based auction exchange NYSE, electronic exchange TSX
uses a Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) system, thus orders are required to be
in the book to have standing.24 By studying decrements in the inside depth on
one side of the quote that correspond to uncommon trade sizes (like a trade of
1,300 shares), matching trades with prevailing quotes of five-second lead (Lee
and Ready (1991)) is reasonable: a trade is considered buyer-initiated if it is
higher than the five-second earlier mid-quote, and seller-initiated if lower.25
I construct the preliminary datasets for estimation of the PIN following
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Hvidjkaer, and O’Hara
23Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root test
is conducted for each pair of daily closing price time series with appropriate lag lengths, per
Akaike (1974), to verify first-order integration (I(1)). Applying Johansen’s (1991) either the trace
or eigen-value tests yielded one co-integrating equation for each TSX-NYSE co-listed pair. These
results provide justification for constructing error correction models (ECMs) to estimate the in-
formation shares of each co-listed pair’s exchanges.
24I owe this comment to Daniel Weaver. See Eun and Sabherwal (2003) for a detailed institu-
tional comparison between the TSX and the NYSE.
25See Schultz and Shive (2008) for trade misclassification of the TAQ on the NYSE which be-
comes severe after 2000.
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(2002). The NYSE-resident specialists are central to the theory of the PIN (Easley,
O’Hara, and Saar (2001), and Duarte and Young (2008)). There are official mar-
ket makers, known as registered traders, on the TSX whose function is akin to
that of NYSE specialists. Thus, a comparison of trade informedness on the two
exchanges by the PIN is deemed appropriate.26
1.4.2 Preliminary results
The PINs for TSX- and NYSE-listed Canadian stocks are estimated following
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) and Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara
(1997a, 1997b).27 The arithmetic means of monthly PIN estimates of 56 Canadian
cross-listers on the TSX and the NYSE are plotted in Figure A.1. It appears that
the TSX, on average, dominates the NYSE in terms of the PIN in annual estimates
for the cross-listed pairs through the sample period.28
The bid-ask spreads29 are adjusted by the mid-quotes and, thus, measure the
relative discrepancy between bid and ask quotes free from the exchange rate.
Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003), the mid-points of U.S.-Canada exchange
rate bid and ask quotes are updated every minute. The bid and ask quotes
of the NYSE-listed Canadian stocks are matched with their concurrent minutes’
exchange rate quote mid-points. Based on mutual interaction (orthogonalized
26I owe this comment to Lawrence Kryzanowski. See Fuller, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008)
for difficulties in estimation of the PIN for NASDAQ trades.
27I adopt Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu’s (2008) log-likelihood function specification for im-
proved numerical stability in computing the the PIN. See Appendix A.3.
28The annual estimates for the PIN on the TSX are {0.242, 0.213, 0.206} in 1998, 1999, and 2000,
respectively, while the corresponding estimates for the NYSE are {0.204, 0.212, 0.196}, over the
same period. The spikes in PIN are seen in the post-decimalization period between November
and December 1999, a finding consistent with Zhao and Chung (2006).
29SPREADNYSE ≡ askNYSE − bidNYSE(askNYSE + bidNYSE)/2 ; and SPREADTSX ≡ askTSX − bidTSX(askTSX + bidTSX)/2 .
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impulse responses) of bid and ask quotes on the TSX and the NYSE, the informa-
tion shares30 of the TSX and the NYSE for each cross-listed pair are estimated per
Hasbrouck (1995, 2007).
The averages across monthly estimates of PINs, spreads, and information
shares of each pair over the entire sample period are listed in Table A.1.31 About
twenty firms in the sample exhibit higher PINs on the NYSE than on the TSX. For
some cross-listers, like Manulife Financial Corp. and Suncor Energy Inc., there
is no significant difference between the PINs on the two exchanges. Only nine
firms in the sample show higher spreads on the TSX, and only two firms have
higher information shares on the NYSE.
First, on average, the PIN on the TSX (0.242) exceeds that on the NYSE (0.214).
Second, the relative quoted spread on the TSX (0.015) is narrower than that on
the NYSE (0.022). Third, the information share of the TSX (0.544) is higher than
that of the NYSE (0.455). For a Canadian cross-lister, on average, it appears that
more price discovery takes place on the TSX (the lead market) where the inten-
sity of informed trades tends to be heavier (a higher PIN) and yet with lower
spreads (competitive market making).
The impulse response function plots of bid and ask quotes for Abitibi Con-
solidated, Inc. are shown in Figure A.2. Each of the four consecutive charts
specifies the source of innovation by two standard deviations. The quotes on
the NYSE rarely affect the quotes on the TSX. To the contrary, positive increases
30Since there are four quote prices (bidTSX, askTSX, bidNYSE, and askNYSE), there are 24 (= 4!) order-
ings in terms of Cholesky exogeneity. For each TSX-NYSE co-listed pair, thus, there are 24 pairs
of TSX-NYSE information shares. Averaging across varying exogeneity reduces them to a single
pair of information shares for each cross-listed pair. See Appendix A.4.
31For brevity, in Table A.1, I do not present the monthly estimates (January 1998 through
December 2000) of the PINs , spreads, and information shares for the cross-listed pairs. They
are, however, available upon request.
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in ask and bid prices on the TSX are followed by changes in ask and bid prices
on the NYSE, respectively. This pattern does not hold for all cross-listed stocks,
and the degree to which an exchange responds to the other side is reflected in
the magnitude of information share.
Based on the ten-minute frequency relative premiums of 56 cross-listed pairs
traded through the sample period, the arithmetic mean, the median, and the
standard deviation are 0.00306, 0.00004, and 0.03031, respectively (Panel A of
Table A.2). The average relative premium of 30.1 basis points with a 3.03 per-
cent volatility is a statistically insignificant deviation from parity. This suggests
the extent to which Toronto and New York are integrated.32 A regression anal-
ysis of relative premiums against cross-border differences in the proportions of
informed traders is conducted in Panel B of Table A.2. It shows that a higher
PIN on a stock listed on the TSX, on average, is associated with a positive pre-
mium on the cross-listed stock traded on the NYSE. This strongly supports the
extended Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model presented in Section 2. The seem-
ingly unarbitrageable and negligibly positive average daily relative premium is
a result of cross-border imbalance in private information.
32See Kryzanowski and Zhang (2002) for further intraday analyses of price differences of
Canadian cross-listed pairs traded in Toronto and New York.
22
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Informed trading and cross-border price discovery
Based on monthly estimates, the statistical significance of the TSX’s dominance
over the NYSE in terms of the PIN can be verified by the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.33 In the first column of Table A.3, the Wilcoxon-test statistic, under the null
hypothesis is very strongly rejected at a 1% right-tail significance level. Thus,
the traders on the TSX posses relatively more private information on Canadian
cross-listed stocks than their counterparts on the NYSE. However, this is likely
to be the result of institutional background of the TSX where insider trading
was more feasible due to delayed prosecution by the authority (King and Segal
(2004)).34
Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002) report that the influence of the NYSE on
price discovery against its regional counterparts increases as its spreads com-
pared to those of the regionals’ decrease. In the cross-border context, competi-
tive market making by the TSX versus the NYSE can be inferred from, similarly,
comparing the bid-ask spreads on the TSX and on the NYSE.35 The test result
overwhelmingly agrees with the alternative hypothesis as seen in the second
column of Table A.3. As a result, the market makers on the TSX are more com-
petitive in setting quote spreads than their competitors on the NYSE are.
Relative dominance of the TSX over the NYSE in terms of information share
33H0 : PINTSX = PINNYSE versus H1 : PINTSX > PINNYSE.
34Canadian insider trading was no less egregious than that of the U.S. until 2003 when the
anti-white collar crime act was legislated under the Criminal Code. See King and Segal (2004)
for an excellent survey on this issue.
35H0 : SPREADTSX = SPREADNYSE versus H1 : SPREADTSX < SPREADNYSE.
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can be empirically checked36 and the test confirms that the information share
of the TSX, on average, far exceeds that of the NYSE as seen in the third column
of Table A.3. Thus, the TSX contributes more to price discovery than the NYSE
does.
In order to check for robustness of the Wilcoxon test results shown in Table
A.3, I construct a monthly panel dataset of the PIN, spread, the information
share, volume,37 and the TSX indicator.38 In Panels A, B, and C of Table A.4, the
PIN, spread, and the information share are, respectively, regressed against the
others controlling for volume and the TSX dummy variable. The signs of the
binary TSX variable in Models 2 and 3 confirm the results shown in Table A.3.
Trade informedness (PIN) is graver on the exchange with a higher information
share (vice versa) as shown by Models 1 and 2 in Panel A (Panel C) of Table
A.4.39
In summary, I find that for the cross-listed of pairs the TSX assumes leader-
ship in price discovery and also shows an, overall, higher PIN than the NYSE.
In other words, the trading venue with heavier intensity of informed trades
contributes more to the price discovery of cross-listed pairs. This is explicit em-
pirical evidence that informed traders catalyze cross-border price discovery.
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) conclude that informed traders prefer to trade in a
market where more original information can be found. By extension, I use direct
relative measures of informed trades (PIN) and contribution to price discovery
(information share). The trades executed on the lead exchange, TSX, are more
36H0 : ISTSX = ISNYSE versus H1 : ISTSX > ISNYSE.
37The monthly average of the logs of total daily trading volumes.
38Equals one if the estimated numerical value is of the TSX, or zero if the NYSE.
39Further, the panel regression results in Table A.4 are robust to Fama and MacBeth’s (1973)
test.
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likely to be information-based than the trades executed on the lag exchange,
NYSE. The PINs of a cross-listed pair represent the proportions of exchange-
specific informed traders.
1.5.2 Dynamics of relative premiums
The Canadian listings on the NYSE, on average, carry slightly positive and
highly volatile relative premiums relative to their home listing on the TSX
through the sample period (Panel A of Table A.2). Throughout trading hours,
the pairs appear to be fairly priced and the small premium on an average NYSE-
cross-listing carries against its original TSX-listing is not surprising given the
implication of the extended Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model presented in
Section 2.40
As the relatively high standard deviation suggests, there evidently are more-
than-profitable, but short-lived, relative premiums which subsequently attract
pairs traders. It is natural to ask how quickly and by whom a temporarily prof-
itable relative premium is pushed back towards parity. Following Gagnon and
Karolyi (2004), I estimate the convergence speed parameter in a daily frequency
for each firm. The PIN effect on the convergence speed can be inferred from
regressing the convergence speed parameter (SPEEDCONV) onto the average PIN
on both exchanges, since convergence speed is a mutual concept, and average
spread (on both exchanges), controlling for firm size,41 industry dummy,42 vol-
40In Section 2, based on an extended version of the noisy rational expectations model of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), I derive an implication of “home market liquidity dominance”:
higher-PIN TSX-listed stock must be priced lower than its NYSE-listed share in a “no-arbitrage”
equilibrium.
41The average log market capitalization on the TSX and the NYSE.
42Equals one if the cross-lister is a manufacturing firm, and zero otherwise.
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ume,43 and governance index44 as follows
SPEEDCONV = γ1PINAVG+γ2SPREADAVG+γ3SIZE+γ4INDUSTRY+γ5VOLUME+γ6GOVERNANCE+η.
According to the regression model, the dynamics of synchronous relative
premiums is explained by the asymmetric information component (PIN) and
market friction (spread) while holding liquidity constraint (volume) and firm
characteristics (size, industry, and the level of corporate governance) constant.
It turns out that, in Panel A of Table A.5, a higher PIN on either exchange very
significantly impedes the convergence to parity in all specifications, since the
convergence speed parameter is reciprocal to actual speed. This is against the
second hypothesis raised in Section 3. The uninformed traders appear to deplete
relative premiums faster than their informed cohort. The PIN effect appears
robust controlling for liquidity of cross-listed pairs in Models 2, 3, and 4. The
higher the spread on either exchange (the higher the average spread as a result)
the slower the convergence speed in Models 1, 2, and 4.
Practitioners executing statistical arbitrages (pairs trades) and profiting from
relative premiums need not be informed of the issuer’s fundamental value.
Timely execution and unwinding of their positions will suffice. Thus, statistical
arbitrageurs are believed to be discretionary liquidity traders who are respon-
sible for quickly converging and low-PIN cross-listed pairs.45 This novel finding
is among a few articles in the literature relating the dynamics of premiums and
43The log of total daily trading volume on the TSX and the NYSE, respectively.
44The Report on Business governance index of Canadian firms is published by Globe and Mail
(McFarland (2002)). Full scores in the four following criteria total up to 100 points: board com-
position (40), compensation (23), shareholder rights (22), and disclosure (15). The higher the
index score, the better the firm is governed. I appreciate Stephen Foerster and Michael King for
sharing this information.
45Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) distinguish discretionary liquidity traders who can skillfully
and strategically time their executions, in contrast to non-discretionary liquidity (or noise)
traders.
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discounts on pairs of cross-listed shares to information asymmetry. Similarly,
Gagnon and Karolyi (2009a) find that, controlling for various proxies of infor-
mation asymmetry, holding costs of long-short portfolios of cross-listed pairs
significantly explain the cross-sectional and time-series variation in price parity
deviations.
I further explore the cross-sectional relationship between the average spread
across the exchanges against the average PIN on both exchanges, and conver-
gence speed, controlled for firm size and industry dummy. In Panel B of Table
A.5, the average PIN is very significantly positively associated with the aver-
age spread which is consistent with the finding of Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and
Paperman (1996).
SPREADAVG = δ1 PINAVG + δ2 SPEEDCONV + δ3 SIZE + δ4 INDUSTRY + .
Panel B of Table A.2 shows that a higher PIN of a stock listed on the TSX gives
rise to a positive premium in the stock cross-listed on the NYSE. This relation is
robust to controlling for convergence speed and governance index as shown in
Panel C of Table A.5. This provides further support for the extended Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) model presented in Section 2.
(pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX = β1 (PINTSX − PINNYSE)+ β2 SPEEDCONV + β3 GOVERNANCE + .
One arbitrageur may prefer to short-sell on the NYSE and to long on the TSX,
while another to short-sell on the TSX and to long on the NYSE for liquidity
reasons. This may render using the quote mid-points of U.S.-Canada exchange
rate problematic.46 For example, it may be easier to short-sell on the TSX than
46I owe this point to Bhagwan Chowdhry. In other words, dynamics in the foreign exchange
market are another source of innovation to the cointegrated system of cross-listed pairs (Gram-
mig et al. (2005)).
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on the NYSE. The cross-border relative quoted spreads are defined as follows
˜SPREADNT ≡ {askNYSE − bidTSX · (US$/CAN$)ask} / {bidTSX · (US$/CAN$)ask} ,
˜SPREADTN ≡ {askTSX · (US$/CAN$)bid − bidNYSE} / bidNYSE.
˜SPREADNT is the percentage cross-border arbitrage profit from buying on the
TSX and selling on the NYSE, and ˜SPREADTN is from buying on the NYSE and
selling on the TSX. The first strategy narrows down ˜SPREADNT, while the second
pairs trade squeezes ˜SPREADTN. Either strategy may turn out more lucrative
than the other due to the existence of bid-ask spread in the exchange rate.
In Table A.6, monthly averages of cross-border relative quoted spreads (up-
dated every minute) of 56 cross-listed pairs are tested for differences using the
Wilcoxon test. It turns out that the two spread measures are empirically equiv-
alent. In other words, arbitrageurs’ positions are not skewed towards either
trans-Niagara trading venue due to exchange rate market friction. Thus, using
exchange rate mid-quotes appears reasonable.
1.5.3 Cross-listing effects on the home exchange
Table A.7 shows fifteen Canadian firms that cross-listed on the NYSE during
the sample period. Twelve firms had been listed on the TSX before they cross-
listed on the NYSE. The firms without the PIN either have cross-listing dates
too near the end of the sample period or are insufficiently liquid. For the PIN
estimates before and after cross-listing events, there are eight pairs with a six-
month window, six pairs with a twelve-month window, and nine pairs with an
exhaustive window.
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The arithmetic means of the columns of the PIN show that they rise around
the cross-listing events. The pre- versus post-cross-listing scatter plots are pro-
vided for respective event windows in Figures A.3, A.4, and A.5. The PIN on
the TSX, on average, rises upon cross-listing on the NYSE within all event win-
dows. The significance of the PIN increase (rise in the relative degree of adverse
selection) around cross-listings can be verified by the Wilcoxon test with the
difference in PINs before and after cross-listings.47
In Panel A of Table A.8, each of the null hypotheses against the alternative
hypotheses are rejected at a 10% right-tail significance level. This result that the
PIN rises (or that the intensity of private information increases) on the home
exchange upon cross-listing unifies and extends the existing claims in the cross-
border finance literature.
Cross-listing lowers transaction costs and narrows the spreads on the TSX
and, resultantly, reduces noise trader risk (Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Fleming,
Ostdiek, Whaley (1996), and Jones and Seguin (1997)), or subdues excessive
volatility borne by liquidity trades. The more grave degree of adverse selection
in the home market shown in Panel A of Table A.8 is the first documentation of
relative cross-listing effects on the home exchange information environment.48
The aforementioned articles only mention the decrease in absolute magnitude of
noise trades.
The TSX-listed firms, on average, post negative cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) within all event windows around cross-listings in Table A.7. This result
47H0 : PIN+3M = PIN−3M versus H1 : PIN+3M > PIN−3M,
H0 : PIN+6M = PIN−6M versus H1 : PIN+6M > PIN−6M,
H0 : PINafter = PINbefore versus H1 : PINafter > PINbefore.
48In a comparable case, Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) report that the PIN on B shares in
China (that had only been legally traded by foreign investors) rises on opening access to locals.
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bears resemblance to that of Foerster and Karolyi (1999). It is reasonable that
Canadian firms who cross-list in the U.S. do not benefit from lower costs of
capital. Unlike those in the emerging market economies, Canadian managers
can easily diversify their financing risk across the border.
There appears to be no discernable relative premium due to diminished mar-
ket incompleteness (Merton (1987)) for Canadian cross-listers in the U.S. The
higher post-cross-listing PIN intuitively explains the negative event study re-
turns on the home-listed stocks. As the original TSX listings become more con-
centrated with private information, they must reflect relative discounts in equi-
librium, as in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).
RETURNAB = β0 + β1 PIN + β2 CROSS-LIST + β3 SPREAD + β4 VOLUME + β5 VOLATILITY
+ β6 PIN × CROSS-LIST + β7 SPREAD × CROSS-LIST
+ β8 VOLUME × CROSS-LIST + β9 VOLATILITY × CROSS-LIST + .
Accordingly, the negative abnormal returns on the TSX-listed stocks upon cross-
listing on the NYSE are associated with heavier trade informedness in Table A.9.
In the fixed-effect panel regression analyses, the abnormal returns49 (RETURNAB)
on the original listings on the TSX are regressed, on a monthly basis, onto the
PIN, cross-listing dummy,50 spread,51 volume,52 return volatility,53 and cross-
listing interaction terms. Once cross-listed, the home-listed stocks’ underperfor-
mance against the market typically magnifies as the intensity of informed trades
(PIN×CROSS-LIST) increases. This relation is robust to controlling for spread,
volume, and volatility measures which do not appear as economically and sta-
tistically significant as the PIN after cross-listings on the NYSE.
49The monthly abnormal return, following Binder (1998), using the S&P TSX Composite Index.
50A dummy variable which equals one in the month of cross-listing event, or zero otherwise.
51The monthly average relative quoted spread.
52The monthly average of the logs of total daily trading volumes.
53The standard deviation of daily returns multiplied by 250/12.
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Panel B of Table A.8 shows that the bid-ask spreads evidently narrow af-
ter cross-listing events over the exhaustive threshold window (before and after
cross-listing through the sample period), a finding consistent with Foerster and
Karolyi (1998). Whether Canadian firms’ cross-listings on the NYSE facilitate en-
hanced volume54 on the home exchange is shown in Panel C of Table A.9. Sta-
tistically, the incremental effect of cross-listing on home market liquidity is not
strong, perhaps due to the limited sample size. This may also reflect Karolyi’s
(2006) summarizing remark that “... Price discovery does not necessarily orig-
inate in the markets with the highest relative turnover, but rather where the
informed traders are going with limited market impact.”
The above findings suggest that, at least within integrated economies, cross-
listings boost the intensity of private information-based trades in home-listed
stocks. A higher proportion of informed traders is a double-edged sword: it
fosters price discovery and exacerbates adverse selection. This shift in informa-
tion environment lends support to the claim of Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006)
that cross-listings may not reduce information asymmetry. The managers of
Canadian firms may have been led to trading on inside information upon cross-
listings that resulted in undermining their existing shareholder values given
the comparatively lax insider trading environment on the TSX (King and Segal
(2004)) during the sample period. The result herein may contradict the bond-
ing hypothesis (Coffee (1999)) which states that insiders have “less” incentive
to trade after cross-listings.
54The log of daily total trading volume of TSX-listed shares of NYSE-cross-listed Canadian
firms.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I address how information asymmetry determines relative pricing
of Canadian stocks that trade across the Niagara Falls. The theoretical predic-
tion is empirically supported with evidence on Canadian shares listed on both
the Toronto and New York stock exchanges, from January 1998 through Decem-
ber 2000. The three key results reveal “information asymmetry is priced” across
the border, across time, and around cross-listing events. Overall, the PIN proves
to be a useful for understanding the effect of asymmetric information on stock
trading fragmented across an international border.
My first empirical finding reveals that, on average, the TSX leads the NYSE
in price discovery (measured by information share) and shows a higher PIN.
In other words, the exchange with greater intensity of informed trading con-
tributes more to price discovery. This is explicit cross-border evidence that in-
formed traders stoke price discovery. However, the higher proportion of in-
formed traders on the TSX is, likely to be, due to the comparatively lax regula-
tory environment therein by then. Second, I find that New York and Toronto
prices of lower-PIN stocks converge more rapidly. Specifically, a preponder-
ance of discretionary liquidity traders yields a low PIN, and some of them at-
tempt to arbitrage the relative premium when there are fewer informed traders
around. This novel finding is among a few notable documentations that re-
late the dynamics of premiums and discounts on home versus foreign listings
to asymmetric information. Finally, on average, the PIN on a TSX-listed stock
rises upon cross-listing on the NYSE. This finding of relative cross-listing effects
on the home market information environment not only explains negative cross-
listing announcement event study returns but also unifies and extends existing
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findings in the literature. Previous articles mention a reduced noise trader risk
as a result of decreased transaction costs on the home exchange following cross-
listings. That fragmentation due to cross-listing aggravates adverse selection, or
exacerbates transparency in order flow, on the home exchange may offer useful
insight into recent research direction in market microstructure.
There are numerous unresolved issues for cross-listings between integrated
markets. The consequences of cross-listings by Canadian firms I have shown
imply that insiders may trade more on hidden corporate information in their
home market as their companies cross-list overseas. This is likely to be a
downside of cross-listing. As this contradicts the bonding hypothesis, I leave
a testable hypothesis for future research. Cross-listing emerging market firms
may warrant higher event study returns on their home exchanges than for de-
veloped country firms. This is possible since the former group’s bonding effect
is dominant while the latter group’s adverse selection aggravates like I have
shown in the paper.
Lastly, I would like to mention limitations of this study. Unlike in Gagnon
and Karolyi (2009a), the herein defined relative premiums may overstate the
actual relative arbitrage returns since I do not account for arbitrage costs. The
cross-listing effect on the TSX can be assessed in a finer detail by estimating
effective transaction costs per Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Hasbrouck
(2009), and Tiwari (2004). By incorporating random shocks from the foreign
exchange market (Grammig et al. (2005)) into quote analysis of the cross-listed
pairs on the TSX and the NYSE, there can be more implications to shed light on
unanswered questions in the literature.
33
CHAPTER 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & CROSS-BORDER ACQUIREE RETURNS
2.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions are the most frequent means of corporate control
transfer, and each deal potentially creates value to be transferred among parties.
For example, Jensen (1993) finds that the market for corporate control is a key
conduit for the efficient handling of excess capacity and further points out that,
in the absence of such a market, weak internal control generally delays value-
creating restructuring. Even when no explicitly measurable wealth is created,
existing value may still be transferred among parties, so it is reasonable to inves-
tigate the role of corporate governance in mergers and acquisitions. Specifically,
we explore here whether mergers and acquisitions act as a tool to enforce corpo-
rate governance discipline, as firms seeking to benefit from the corporate control
market must first convince participants that they are well governed. Following
a well-developed corporate governance literature, we study anti-takeover pro-
visions (ATPs) as a proxy for corporate governance under the observation that
firms with more ATPs are more strongly protected and hence more difficult for
the control market to punish should they behave unscrupulously, i.e. more ATPs
signifies weaker governance.
We find that, in domestic U.S. deals, targets exhibit higher abnormal returns
upon merger announcement when their bidders are more poorly governed,
consistent with the notion that the market expects targets of poorly governed
firms to be relatively overpaid. Our study is the first to document this rela-
tion in the context of ATPs, though other studies find consistent qualitative con-
34
clusions using different measures. We also investigate cross-border deals, as
the multiple market nature of these deals presents additional unique and non-
negligible take-over challenges, and find that overseas targets also benefit more
from poorly governed U.S. acquirers than well governed ones. However, sur-
prisingly, in cross-border deals, poorly governed acquirers also enjoy greater
merger announcement premiums than their well-governed counterparts. This
finding is contrary to both the aforementioned intuition and the U.S. domestic
market findings of Masulis et al. (2007) and others. While we conjecture possi-
ble explanations, we leave robust resolution of this puzzle as a topic of future
research.
It is conventional wisdom that, in the market for control, bidders lose in the
stock market when they overpay for targets. Masulis et al. (2007) finds that the
acquirers with more ATPs perform worse than their peers at merger announce-
ment, ostensibly because firms with more ATPs are more poorly governed and
hence tend to overpay on overage. As suggested by Gompers et al. (2003), these
so-called “dictator” acquirers, who are more difficult to take over and who are
more entrenched, generate premiums for targets because their corporate struc-
tures offer weak or no disincentives for reckless behavior, making them more
prone to empire building and other such agency concerns.
This relation, however, is confounded in the cross-border context. These
deals, while an intriguing and legally more complicated environment in which
to test the existence of value effects, represent changes in investor protection
related to both corporate governance and sovereign legal systems, the latter
in turn affecting the characteristics and financial markets of the firms them-
selves. La Porta et al. (1998) reports a significant relation between legal pro-
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tection and the development of financial markets, while subsequent work by
Lubrano (2003) further documents that improvements in corporate governance
contribute to the maturity of capital markets. Claessens and Laeven (2003) sim-
ilarly notes that firms in countries with better-enforced property rights enjoy
better growth prospects. Indeed, it has been shown that the legal environ-
ment potentially impacts the financing decision (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksi-
movic (1999)); market efficiency (Mørck et al. (2000)); the degree of foreign ex-
change collapse (Johnson et al. (2000)); capital allocation (Wurgler (2000), Beck
and Levine (2002), and Claessens and Laeven (2003)); and even firm valuation
(La Porta et al. (2002) and Himmelberg et al. (2002)).
However, it is likewise the case that firms may execute an optimal level of
self-imposed governance by applying their own guidelines in addition to ex-
tant legal boundaries. So long as contracts are enforceable and abided by, in-
vestors can be protected to the same extent by all firms regardless of the legal
environment, ergo, the legal environment alone cannot determine the totality of
investor protection. Along those lines, Bris and Cabolis (2008) documents that,
despite controls for cross-country differences, differences in firm-level corpo-
rate governance generate significant value effects for the merged entity, though
their work uses accounting standards derived from sovereign-level measures
of La Porta et al. (1998), as its measure of corporate governance. Likewise,
La Porta et al. (2002) demonstrates that benefits from better macro-level share-
holder protection are more pronounced when CEOs’ cash flow rights are rela-
tively small. Indeed, a lengthy literature suggests that even private contracts
and ATP specifics are priced, among these Bebchuk et al. (2004), Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005), and Cremers and Nair (2005). Stated simply, both the literature
and common sense suggest that cross-country variations caused by differences
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in the macro-environment and cross-sectional differences in governance at the
firm level both impact investor protection. Our study seeks to control for and
separate these two governance factors.
We first document that, for domestic U.S. deals, acquirers with more ATPs
in place pay a higher premium. This serves to confirm the intuition that man-
agerial recklessness leads to higher premiums and benefits target shareholders.
However, in addition to domestic deals, our study confirms using cross-border
deals that, despite controls for sovereign legal systems and investor protection,
it is nonetheless the case that U.S. acquirers that are poorly governed tend to pay
more than their well-governed counterparts, benefiting overseas target share-
holders. Similarly, Starks and Wei (2004) finds acquirers from countries with su-
perior sovereign-level corporate governance pay smaller acquisition premiums,
but do not examine the effects of firm-level governance. While we investigate
U.S. acquirers of foreign targets, Kuipers et al. (2003) shows that foreign ac-
quirers from countries with better investor protection pay more for U.S. targets.
However, their study also falls short of investigating firm-level corporate gov-
ernance.1 By proxying for both firm-level governance and country-level factors,
we conclude that not only geographic location and differences in legal systems
but also poor firm-level governance of the acquirer account for the premium
paid to foreign target shareholders (henceforth the “dictator premium”).
In addition, we also document that poorly governed U.S. acquirers enjoy
higher post-announcement returns than their well-governed counterparts in
cross-border deals. In contrast, Masulis et al. (2007) reports no benefits for
1In less closely related work aimed at cross-border deals, Doukas and Travlos (1988) shows
that the announcement effect is greater if the acquirer is a first-time entrant into the foreign
market. Chari et al. (2004) finds the acquirer’s return is more positive when the it attains man-
agement control of the target.
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poorly governed acquirers in U.S. domestic deals. Importantly, our study in-
cludes only publicly listed acquirers and targets while Masulis et al. (2007) in-
cludes private U.S. domestic targets in their sample. Public firms are generally
more transparent, are followed by more analysts, and are thus more closely
monitored. While this difference in data may explain this disparate finding, we
leave full resolution of this puzzle to future work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses exist-
ing theories that illustrate our key intuition and generate testable hypotheses,
section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology employed, section 4
presents empirical and estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theory and hypotheses
There is an extensive literature on agency problems and corporate governance.
Indeed, the agency literature speaks to the tension between shareholders and
managers and can date as far back as Berle and Means (1933) and certainly
Jensen and Meckling (1976). More specifically addressing corporate gover-
nance, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) provides support for a negative
relation between corporate governance and agency concerns, further document-
ing that poorly governed firms under-perform. Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jar-
rell et al. (1988), and Andrade et al. (2001) each extensively examine this topic.
Our focus is on how these findings impact the corporate control market.
Mørck et al. (1990), Lang et al. (1991), and Jensen (1986) all conclude that, while
acquisitions may substantially benefit the firm, it generally benefits managers
and managers may themselves generally focused on personal interests rather
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than the good of the shareholders.2 In response, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) shows
that the market for corporate control can also serve to suppress agency prob-
lems since managers that make unwise acquisitions are in turn more likely to be
taken over themselves. Hence, the extent to which the firms may be taken over
may directly relate to the behavior of managers. Those who are well-entrenched
may be more prone to agency problems since it is then comparatively difficult to
punish them. As Bebchuk et al. (2002, 2003) and Field and Karpo (2002) explain,
ATPs make takeovers difficult as they significantly slow the takeover process,
generate higher transactions costs, and hence curb the incentives of potential
bidders to acquire firms in a hostile takeover. Thus, we posit that number of
ATPs is a proxy for managerial recklessness and is a negative measure of the
firm’s commitment to investor protection: the greater the number of ATPs, the
worse a firm’s corporate governance.
2.2.1 U.S. domestic deals
The impact of firm-level governance on the market for corporate control has
been oft studied in the domestic environment, and our goal is to test for a con-
sistent finding in our domestic U.S. dataset. Namely, do U.S. targets respond
more favorably to domestic bidders with high ATPs?
In this study, we choose to focus on target firms. In contrast, Masulis et al.
(2007) shows that acquirers with more ATPs have more negative announcement
period returns than their low ATP counterparts. They conclude that acquiring
firms pay higher merger premia, which is reflected in a more negative return.
2Yermack (2006) shows that corporate size, i.e. empire building, is directly associated with
executive perquisites, implying that mergers and acquisitions may be self-serving and generate
positive externalities for executives at the cost of shareholder value.
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However, a variety of factors affect acquirer returns that are difficult to quantify
and control for since the acquirer will be the on-going concern and is often a
larger, more complex business entity than the target. We focus on targets and
contend that when high ATP bidders acquire targets, target shareholders extract
greater returns since acquirers overpay. This is often essentially a cash-out sce-
nario, especially for high-level managers making the decision, so any overpay-
ment transfers directly to shareholders. Investor appraisal of merger effects on
the targets have received less than due attention. Although Huang and Walk-
ling (1987) and Song and Walking (1993) relate merger wealth effect on targets
with deal characteristics and ownership stake, respectively, there is a dearth of
scholarly articles that reason the value of private contracts that foster manage-
rial recklessness, i.e. ATPs, enforced by the acquirers being impounded on the
target returns upon merger announcements. In other words, we argue that the
target returns are a more visible and less complicated measure of value transfer
through mergers. Specifically:
H1 [Dictator Premium Hypothesis]: Ceteris paribus, the higher the ATP
index of the acquirer, the higher the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of
the domestic target.
2.2.2 Cross-border deals
Cross-border deals are growing in popularity and generate unique and im-
portant sources of value. As documented by Alexander (2000), cross-border
takeovers may result from 1. intensive conglomeration as a method of preemp-
tive restructuring or generating economies scale, 2. response to technological
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innovation, 3. need for a global marketing platform, 4. absence of domestic
merger targets, and 5. the desire or need to expand into new markets. As Starks
and Wei (2004) finds acquirers from countries with superior sovereign-level cor-
porate governance pay smaller acquisition premiums, but do not examine the
effects of firm-level governance, there remains empirical verification of whether
recklessness of individual U.S. acquiring firm managers can still, unintention-
ally, benefit their foreign target shareholders by impulse-driven overpayment.
Extending the intuition from the domestic deals scenario, we hypothesize that
bidder with more ATPs will likewise overpay in foreign acquisitions such that:
H2 [Cross-border Dictator Premium Hypothesis]: Ceteris paribus, the
higher the ATP index of the acquirer, the higher the CAR of the cross-border
target.
2.3 Data and methodology
The key piece of data for this study is our measure of corporate governance,
the ATP index. For each firm, the index is calculated as the total number of
ATPs listed in the firm’s articles of incorporation, the higher number of ATPs,
the higher the index. This method mimics the methodologies of Gompers et
al. (2003)’s “G Index” and Masulis et al. (2007) , which are both based upon
24 total possible ATPs.3 These papers define democracy (dictatorship) as firms
with an index less than or equal to 5 (greater than or equal to 14) and less than
or equal to 9 (greater than or equal to 10), respectively. We follow the latter of
3Bebchuk, et al.’s (2004) index is based on only 6 ATPs while Cremers and Nair’s (2005) index
is composed of only 3. Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2005) applies a binary variable based on whether
a firm has a staggered board.
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these papers in our definition.
The data required is held at the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) which contains firm-level data for publication years 1990, 1993, 1995,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Nearly 1,500 firms are represented in the
dataset each year, including the S&P 500 and those on the Forbes, Business
Week, and Fortune magazines’ lists of largest U.S. corporations. On average,
the database represents about 90 percent of U.S. stock market capitalization,
though more recent years’ data are more inclusive. Following the literature, we
assume that index does not change between publications years.
2.3.1 M&A data
We acquire deal data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). For domestic
deals, we collect data on 1456 acquisitions between January 1990 and December
2007 that meet the following criteria: 1. both target and acquirer are public com-
panies incorporated in the U.S., 2. transaction value exceeds $1 million, 3. the
acquirer controls less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the announcement
and owns 100% of the target’s shares after the transaction, and 4. the acquirer
has annual financial statement information available from Compustat and stock
return data available for at least 210 trading days prior to acquisition announce-
ment. We then match this with our ATP index, reducing the sample to 1439
domestic acquisitions. Figure B.1 illustrates the number of mergers and valu-
ation multiples (price/target earnings) for all deals in our dataset. In Panel A,
we see that domestic deal flow and multiples peaked during the Internet Bubble
period of the late 1990s.
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For cross-border deals, data is available starting in 1984. We apply criteria
that mirror the aforementioned with the exception that the target must be a pub-
lic firm incorporated outside of the U.S. There are 1,024 such cross-border deals
with an average deal size of $359.24 million, for an average stake of 59%. The
most active U.S. acquirers in these deals are Citigroup, Coca-Cola, and Merrill
Lynch (12 deals each), followed by Microsoft (11 deals). In total, 57 countries
are represented with Canada having the largest number of deals, accounting for
25.3% (259 deals) of the total, followed by the U.K. (17%; 174 deals), and Aus-
tralia (8.3%; 85 deals). In terms of industry, using SIC codes, we find that Crude
Petroleum and Natural Gas and Prepackaged Software (44 deals each) are most
common, followed by Pharmaceutical Preparations (32 deals) and Gold Ores (28
deals). We then reduce the dataset to match the time period for domestic deals
and then merge these data with that of our ATP index, reducing the dataset to
599 cross-border deals. Figure B.1 Panel B shows the number of and valuation
multiples for cross-border deals. Once again, the number of deals peaks in the
late 1990s but multiples are lowest during that period, peaking instead near the
beginning and end of our data set.4
For sovereign legal system indicators, we source accounting standards from
La Porta et al. (1998) and anti-director rights-which proxies for the degree of
shareholder protection-from Djankov et al. (2008). We also calculate the ratio
of stock market capitalization to GDP as a relative measure of country-specific
equity market development, also suggested by Djankov et al. (2008). Table B.1
summarizes this data.
4The flattening out of multiples for cross-border deals in the mid and late 1990’s may be
related to currency devaluations experienced during the Asian financial crisis.
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2.3.2 Calculating CAR
Following a sizable literature in this field and others, we apply a short-term
event study methodology that analyzes CAR surrounding deal announcements.
Previous work applying event study techniques around announcement of ATP
adoption or amendment includes DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Linn and Mc-
Connell (1983), Malatesta and Walkling (1988), and Ryngaert (1988).5
For domestic deals, our tests are relatively straightforward. We measure
CAR using a market model adjusted for market risk for the [-2,+2], [-5,+5], and
[-10,+10] windows around the announcement date. Specifically, following Ma-
sulis et al. (2007) we use the CRSP equal-weighted return as our measure of
market return and estimate the market model over the 200-day period starting
210 days before the event, ending 11 days before the event to capture stock run-
ups.6 That is:
Rikτ = αik + βmi Rmτ + ikτ ∀ τ ∈ [−210, · · · ,−11],
where Riτ is the daily return for domestic target i with domestic acquirer k, and
Rmτ is the aforementioned equal-weighted market return. Following the stan-
dard practice, we then apply this βmi , calculate a predicted abnormal return for
the event window, and subtract it from the actual return to arrive at CAR:
CARi jt[±d] ≡
 +d∏
τ=−d
(
1 + ̂i jτ
) − 1, ∀ d ∈ {2, 5, 10} and for annoucement date t.
For cross-border deals, we require some minor revisions. We estimate a
dollar-translated market model for predating days [210, · · · ,−11], following Bris
and Cabolis (2008), and include both the target’s home market index and the
5Bhagat and Romano (2002) provides an extensive survey.
6Masulis et al. (2007) also applies this method.
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MSCI world index. Specifically, we have:
Ri jkτ = αi jk + βmi Rmjτ + β
w
i Rwτ + i jkτ ∀ τ ∈ [−210, · · · ,−11],
where Ri jkτ is the daily return for foreign target i based in country j with U.S.
bidder k, Rmjτ is the market index return in country j, and Rwτ is the return on
the MSCI world index. We calculate CARs for the same event windows, then, in
an analogous fashion:
CARi jkt[±d] ≡
 +d∏
τ=−d
(
1 + ̂i jkτ
) − 1, ∀ d ∈ {2, 5, 10} and for announcement date t.
2.4 Results
Our main results use target CAR as the dependent variable and the acquirer’s
ATP index as the key explanatory variable. We also apply a number of con-
trol variables including deal characteristics, acquirer firm characteristics as they
may confound governance measures, and M&A market conditions.
For deal characteristics, we include log deal value and binary variables for
whether it is a cash deal for whether the acquirer and target are in a high-tech
industry.7 Acquirer firm characteristics include Tobin’s (1969) Q, leverage ratio,
free cash flow ratio, relative deal size, and whether it is a diversifying acquisi-
tion. Finally, our proxy for market conditions is the average premium paid to
targets in a given year. The general form of our regression is as follows:
CAR = β1 ·G Index + β2 · Deal Characteristics
+ β3 · Acquirer & Target Characteristics
+ β4 · M&A Market Condition + error term.
7The high-tech dummy is as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004).
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2.4.1 Domestic dictator premium
In Table B.2, we present the results of tests run using only domestic deals. In
virtually every test, we find that the G index is positively related to target CAR,
i.e. the weaker the governance, the higher returns to target shareholders, im-
plying expected overpayment on the part of acquirers. This is consistent with
hypothesis 1 and echoes the results of the extant literature. The combination
of the Masulis et al. (2007) finding that poorly governed acquirers lose value
and our finding that the targets of these acquirers gain value suggests that these
deals serve as a wealth transfer mechanism between respectively shareholders.
This finding is always statistically significant, almost always at the 5% level, re-
gardless of the size of the window used or which control variables are included.
The first set of tests results presented in Model 1 include controls for deal
characteristics. Deal size plays a role and is negatively related to returns, sta-
tistically significantly so at the 1% level. This is perhaps because, given lim-
ited resources, acquirers are unable to pay high premiums if targets are large
in an absolute sense. Cash deals are more attractive as the relation between
CAR and the cash dummy is positive and again generally significant at the 1%
level. Cash is less risky than an equivalent market value in shares so this is not
surprising. Whether the target or acquirer is a high-tech firm seems positively
related to CAR, though this finding is not consistently significant. A positive
relation could be due to improvements in future growth prospects, generally
considered critical in high-tech firm valuations.
Results presented in Model 2 further address acquirer characteristics as con-
trols. The data for these controls is rather limited and reduces our sample size
to 526. Results are, however, qualitatively, unchanged. Most importantly, target
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CAR is positively related to the G index, hence negatively related to governance.
Cash and deal size coefficients remain significant, though the remaining con-
trols are only significant sporadically. CAR appears to be negatively related to
leverage, possibly a reaction to increased risk of future financial distress, less
access to future capital, or limited ability for managers to overpay given capital
constraints. On the other hand, when the deal represents entrance into a dif-
ferent industry, i.e. acquirer and target have different SIC codes, CAR generally
reacts positively perhaps indicating that greater synergies are likely to result
when business units are less redundant. Notably, in Model 3, we control for po-
tential irregularities related to low-priced stocks, which we define as a target
stock trading at below $10.00 on announcement day, but find no such effects.
Finally, Model 4 includes controls for M&A market conditions, important in
the cyclical market for corporate control. M&A activity has been shown to be re-
lated to ease of financing related to the development of debt instruments, such
as high-yield bonds in the 1980s and collateralized debt obligations in the mid
2000s. They can also be catalyzed by economic booms. Valuations can likewise
be affected by these cycles. We find that, while the market condition factor is
positively related to CAR as expected, the G index remains significantly posi-
tively related, in fact slightly more so.
In summary, controlling for deal, acquirer, and market conditions, we find
that more poorly governed acquirers (higher G index) are expected to overpay
for domestic targets, as reflected in more positive CAR. This suggests that merg-
ers potentially act as a wealth transfer mechanism which takes place, at least
partially, during the announcement window.
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2.4.2 Cross-border dictator premium
The focus of this study is on cross-border deals, the degree of wealth transfer
and the impact of governance at both the sovereign and firm levels on this trans-
fer. First, consider the preliminary results presented in Table B.3 Panel A where
we investigate the CAR of both acquirer and target. Consistent with Jensen
(1993), CAR, referring as before to the targets’ cumulative abnormal returns, are
significantly positive at 13.7%, 14.0%, and 18.4% over the event windows [-2,
+2], [-5, +5], and [-10, +10], respectively, with significance calculated using the
Wilcoxon p-values. However, consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), U.S. acquir-
ers’ cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) are negative at -53bp, -73bp, and -56bp,
over the same event windows, respectively, again statistically significantly so.
In Panel B, we see that correlations between target and acquirer returns are like-
wise negative. As such, it appears that U.S. acquirers execute deals at some
expenses to their shareholders, and wealth transfer appears to be substantial.
What, then, is the role of governance factors in this transfer of wealth? In
Table B.4 Panel A, we show CAR for cross-border targets, separated into those
with well governed acquirers (democracy) and those with poorly governed (dic-
tatorship). We note that, for all horizons, both mean and median CAR are higher
when the acquirer is poorly governed. The difference between the means is
what we call “dictator premium”. Despite a large standard deviation in CARs,
this premium is significantly greater than 0 for all horizons, using Wilcoxon p-
values, shown in Panel B. Indeed, the result is more significant, the longer is
the event window. Although a full multivariate analysis has yet to come, this
agrees with hypothesis H2: targets of more poorly governed acquirers enjoy higher
returns in cross-border deals.
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Interestingly, in Panel C, we test only those acquisitions where 100% of eq-
uity is transferred. Bris and Cabolis (2008) argues that a full acquisition is
unique in that it effectively transfers the governance of the acquirer (as well as
investor protection at the sovereign level) directly to the foreign target. In that
case, one would expect that the lack of overpayment by well governed acquirers
may be offset by the marginal benefit of being acquired by a less risky acquirer.
In fact, we find that, in these deals, the targets of well governed firms enjoy
higher CAR than those of poorly governed. This statement is true of both mean
and median virtually all horizons, though owing to the vastly reduced sample
size, none of these differences are statistically significant (Panel D). We continue
to explore the role of full acquisitions in subsequent multivariate regressions.
2.4.3 Dictator premium concavity and acquirer returns
To add further granularity, Table B.5 Panel A lists CAR and ACAR for each value
of the G index from 2 to 19, the respective minimum and maximum in our cross-
border dataset. The figures appearing in Figure B.2 Panel A show that, for all
three windows, CAR peaks when G is between 10 and 12, an important novel
finding of this study. While CAR is generally positive and is matched with gener-
ally negative ACAR, we find that the relation to the acquirer’s G index is clearly
not monotonic. This finding is novel in the literature that require a further in-
depth investigation.
In Table B.5 Panel B, we provide both the linear and quadratic fitted results
where the dependent variable is once again CAR as follows:
CAR = Intercept + β1 ·G Index + β2 · (G Index)2 + error term.
49
We find that the linear model is never significant, either in F-statistic or in
the t-statistic on the coefficient of the G index. The quadratic model performs
better at all three horizons. The G index coefficient is positive in all three cases
and the quadratic element is negative in all three cases. These findings are sta-
tistically significant for the 5-day ([±2]) and 11-day ([±5]) models, for all rel-
evant t-statistics and F-statistics. In the absence of sound economics of such
phenomenon, we can nonetheless facilitate an environment for further construc-
tive exchanges of thoughts among our readers. Unlike U.S. domestic mergers,
the cross-border nature of these deals also generates additional concerns. For
the foreign target, being acquired by a U.S.-listed corporation creates a de facto
cross-listing. There is an increasing interest in the recent international finance
literature, including Doidge et al. (2004), regarding cross-listing that documents
a positive cross-listing premium, i.e. targets enjoy higher returns when they
are acquired by U.S. firms, arising from improvements in corporate governance
due to more stringent disclosure rules as well as from increased analyst cover-
age of U.S. stocks. When G is particularly low, the U.S. acquiring firm is well
governed, and the foreign target’s CAR is low since acquirers do not overpay.
However, when G is particularly high, the poor governance of the foreign ac-
quirer is perceived as a risk to target shareholders and CAR is eroded. As a
result, the highest acquiree CAR may lie in the median interval of the G index
for cross-border deals. In essence, for targets of relatively well governed firms,
the marginal benefit of being overpaid appears to outweigh the cost of absorb-
ing the risk associated with a more poorly governed acquirer. Symmetrically,
for targets of poorly governed firms, the transfer of poor governance and asso-
ciated costs can outweigh potential overpayment.
Panel C, Table B.5, reveals that, when the dependent variable is the U.S. ac-
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quirer’s return (ACAR), the linear model is found to generate a reasonable fit.
In terms of each coefficient estimates, the quadratic specification is only domi-
nant over the short 5-day ([±2]) period and it loses overall explanatory power
(F-statistic) as the event window widens. For the linear model, the coefficient
is positive and significant for all horizons, with significance increasing as the
horizon lengthens. Puzzlingly, while previously we concluded that acquirers
generally transfer wealth to targets, it appears to be the best governed of these
that transfer the most (or expect to benefit the least from the acquisition). The
figures appearing in Figure B.2 Panel B presents the plots for ACAR. Acquirer
returns generally increase with G index and do so in a linear fashion, consistent
with aforementioned results. Again, a developing literature has yet to come
to a confluence as to whether and how foreign acquisitions generate value for
the acquirer, but our study suggests that the most poorly governed extract the
most value perhaps because investors expect the least scrupulous acquirers to
extract the largest rents from unwitting foreign targets.8 Masulis et al. (2007)
finds the opposite for domestic deals. Poorly governed acquirers perform worse
than their well governed counterparts owing to overpayment, perhaps because
they are unable to benefit from the additional information asymmetry provided
through cross-border deals.9 This, though, is clearly simple conjecture. There
may be hidden variables that we do not account for yet. We will later further in-
vestigate whether the concave curvature of foreign target returns survives after
controlling for deal, acquirer and target characteristics, macroeconomic factors,
M&A market condition, and sovereign measures of corporate governance which
8Dennis et al. (2002) argues U.S. acquirers, at the aggregate level, trade at a discount, while
Doukas and Lang (2003) disagree, though both find that cross-border deals are less value-
destroying than domestic ones.
9Note that our dataset differs from that of Masulis et al. (2007) in two critical ways. First,
our dataset does not include private targets. Second, the sample period in that paper includes
potential valuation bubbles in the late 1990s that might particularly exascerbate valuations es-
pecially of private firms.
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are all possible candidates of missing links that may provide clues.
2.4.4 Sovereign vs. corporate governance impact
We now turn our attention to separating the impact of corporate governance dif-
ferences from sovereign legal system variability. As aforementioned, in cross-
border deals, both the governance of the firm itself and the impact of the legal
systems involved may have an impact on the ability to transfer wealth and the
resulting shareholder response. Specifically, we employ La Porta et al.’s (1998)
and Djankov et al.’s (2008) measures for sovereign legal systems as a control in
our tests. Presented in Table B.6 Panel A are CARs for dictatorship and democ-
racy acquires separated by the anti-director rights (AD), accounting standards
(AS), and stock market cap to GDP ratio (SMCTG) measures. High and low in-
dicate values higher or lower than the median score. Importantly, in this case,
we measure the target’s sovereign governance since all acquirers are from the
U.S. so that a target from a country with a high score implies that the acquirer is
relatively weakly governed at the country level.10
Through all event windows, CAR is, on average, higher in countries high
sovereign governance. That is, when the acquirer’s sovereign governance is rel-
atively weak, it is more likely to overpay, a finding consistent with our general
conclusions and with the notion that the target receives little or no additional
governance protection because of the U.S. legal system . Within low sovereign
governance countries, the dictator premium is negligible. However, within
high sovereign governance countries, dictatorship CAR always exceeds that of
democracy. The difference is statistically and economically significant. We con-
10The U.S. is in the high classification for all three classifications.
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clude that the dictator premium does not necessarily arise from the fact that
the target resided in a country with a qualitatively inferior sovereign system.
For high groups of each sovereign governance measure, the dictator premium
appears ostensible with, overall, statistically significant differences, in Panel B,
over all event periods. When the U.S. acquirer is under dictatorship its foreign
target typically and always experiences a higher event study return when the
target country well protects its investors than not and/or it has a relatively well-
established capital markets than not, as shown in Panel C. This home-country
effect also tends to hold for a well-behaving U.S. acquirer but the data softens
for accounting standards over 11-day and 21-day event windows.
Panel D shows symmetric results for ACARs, analogous to Panel A for for-
eign target CARs, and the overall negative estimates suggest there are value
transfers from the U.S. acquirer shareholders to the foreign target investors. The
effects are both statistically and economically meaningful for dictatorial U.S.
bidders making acquisitions in high-category foreign countries over the 5-day
event window. We now turn to multivariate regression analyses to seek a richer
relation between acquirer corporate governance and cross-border target share-
holder value.
2.4.5 Multivariate regressions for cross-border deals
To mirror the domestic deal tests, we re-run multivariate regressions for cross-
border deals with additional control variables following the spirit of Bris and
Cabolis (2008). This set of cross-border specific controls includes considerations
for aforementioned sovereign corporate governance and macroeconomic vari-
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ables. Specifically, for each cross-border acquisition, we have:11
CAR = Full Acquire · β1 ·G Index + β2 · (G Index)2
+ β3 · Deal Characteristics + β4 · Acquirer & Target Characteristics
+ β5 · M&A Market Condition + β6 · Macroeconomic Factors
+ Full Acquire · β7 · LLSV Indices + error term.
The key explanatory variable is the G index of the acquirer, though we con-
tinue to include relevant control variables as in the case of domestic deals.12
Because cross-border deals are additionally affected by macroeconomic param-
eters and sovereign differences in the aggregate level of corporate governance,
we augment these tests with the per-U.S.-dollar exchange rate (Foreign Ex-
change), the log-difference in per capita GDP between the U.S. and the target
country (GDP), the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (SMCTG) for the
target country from Djankov et al. (2008) representing the degree of financial
market development, and the differences between La Porta et al. (1998)’s in-
dices for the U.S. and the target country. The Full Acquire indicator equals one if
the deal is a 100% acquisition, and zero otherwise. We interact this control with
the G index and La Porta et al. (1998)’s measures since a complete transfer of
ownership may generate a more material change in investor protection.
Results are presented in Table B.7. For both the 11- ([±5]) and 21-day ([±10])
horizons, we once again find that the G index is positively related to CAR. In a
full acquisition, foreign target shareholders benefit the more the number of ATPs
11Bris and Cabolis (2008) additionally constructs a wholesomeness index that reflects antitrust
laws and merger controls, citing the White & Case survey “Worldwide Antitrust Merger Noti-
fication Requirements.” Similarly, Dyck and Zingales (2004) gathers data on statutes requiring
additional shares purchases at certain thresholds.
12The significance of these controls in general M&A deals is discussed by Eckbo et al. (1990)
and others.
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held by their U.S. acquirers (Model 1) and the private contracts are valuable in
addition to risk exposure to sovereign legal measures (AD and AS in Model 2).
In other words, the dictator premium exists, economically and statistically sig-
nificantly, in the hands of foreign investors and the effect is evident controlling
for cross-border differences in the level of country-level protection of investors,
and further macroeconomic factors, deal, acquirer and target characteristics and
M&A market condition (Model 3). Only this full linear model, upon a full ac-
quisition, conserves overall implications intact over the 5-day ([±2]) window.
Asynchronous trading and foreign exchange translation effects may delay quick
responses across the border, though this conjecture warrants a further investiga-
tion. Adding the quadratic G index does not alter the inferences from the linear
model (Model 4), thus its suggests that the concave curvature of target returns
against the G index shown previously is due to unexplained characteristics that
are comprehensively controlled for herein. The grand results in Table B.7 con-
firm that not only country-level protection of investors but also firm-level com-
mitment of a U.S. bidder matters in determining overseas target shareholder
value. In sum, the regression results from domestic and cross-border deals agree
with our central thesis: reckless managers in the acquiring firms are beneficial to their
target shareholders, either domestic or foreign, by means of overpayment as anticipated
by the market participants.
2.5 Conclusion
Our contribution to the market for corporate control literature is in two-fold:
one in U.S. domestic deals and the other in cross-border deals. We find that
the more antitakeover provisions (ATPs) a U.S. acquirer has in-place the higher
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premiums they pay to their domestic shareholders. We extend the domes- tic
finding to the cross-border context and further corroborate that cross-border
target shareholders benefit more from high-ATP U.S. acquirers (dictators) than
from low-ATP peers (democrats).
These results are the first documentation of seemingly beneficial effects
(dictator premiums) on targets—regardless of geographic locations—from ATP-
ridden and, thus supposedly, over-spending bidders listed in the U.S. Lastly,
quite surprisingly, the markets respond more delightedly on acquirers with
more ATPs, upon publicizing cross-border merger deals. This finding is con-
trary to what Masulis et al. (2007) report in U.S. domestic deals, and it warrants
a further scholarly attention. Our contribution to the literature is made by fo-
cusing on how target shareholders within and across the border are affected by
managerial recklessness of U.S. acquirers proxied for by their ATPs.
This study attempts to address only a limited number of agenda in the liter-
ature. As noted throughout this paper, a contract-theoretic approach to unrav-
eling the concave cross-border target returns deserves due attention. Thus far,
we have only relied on an empirical ground by controlling for various candi-
date factors that are of import in the cross-border market for corporate control.
A notable limitation of our research is that we do not account for the target
firms’ ATPs. This is to balance the experimental design settings of domestic ver-
sus foreign mergers, since ATP databases do not exist in the majority of target
countries.
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS: ASIA-PACIFIC EVIDENCE ON
CONVERGENCE AND DYNAMICS
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decades an increasing number of firms have chosen to list their
shares on multiple exchanges in order to reduce capital costs and increase liq-
uidity. According to the World Federation of Exchanges, the global market capi-
talization of cross-listed stocks increased by 16.3% in 2005, reaching the stagger-
ing sum of U.S.$5.76 trillion. Approximately 2,000 cross-listings1 were recorded
in the U.S. alone, where investments in American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)
represented U.S.$657 billion which is 36% more than in 2004.
The popularity of cross-border listing and trading attracts much attention
to this area. Two main issues are studied broadly. First, since an arbitrage
opportunity arises by selling high and buying low when the price spread be-
tween a home-exchange share and its ADR widens sufficiently,2 a myriad of aca-
demic work has attempted to gauge market efficiency by testing the parity of
ADR-underlying prices. However, a number of practical limitations exist like
asynchronous trading and short sale restrictions. Thus, some argue that even
persistent disparity does not counter-example market efficiency.
The second issue is detecting where the pricing information and price dis-
1Including Levels I&II Depositary Receipts (DRs), Level I over-the-Counter (OTC) DRs, Rule
144a private placement DRs, ordinary shares, and Global Registered Shares (GRSs).
2In theory, a violation of the law of one price implies an arbitrage. In practice, the spread has
to sufficiently exceed transaction costs.
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covery are generated for a security traded in a multi-market setting.3 The mar-
ket that determines the security price is called the lead market, otherwise the
lag market. Intuitively, lag market prices must converge to the lead market’s
price. If the market is efficient, the convergence to the parity must occur imme-
diately. However, in reality, much evidence suggests that price deviations may
exist temporarily or even persistently.4 Consequently, people question how fast
the convergence process is. Answering this question may help us better under-
stand market efficiency.
There are several articles in the literature on the convergence and dynamics
of ADR price spread. Koumkwa and Susmel (2005) use the Exponential Smooth
Transition Autoregressive model (ESTAR) to investigate the narrowing diver-
gence of ADR spreads. Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) set a linear time-series regres-
sion model and find that the convergence speed is positively related to financial
market efficiency. Specifically, the convergence process is faster for countries
with higher per-capita GDP, stronger investor protections, higher accounting
standards, fewer short sale restrictions, and greater institutional ownership.
Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2004), we explore the convergence and dy-
namic structure of ADR price spreads. Instead of relying on conventional para-
metric approaches that carry embedded model-specification errors, we adopt a
nonparametric method to estimate the convergence speed parameter. This is a
first known attempt in the cross-listed shares literature. The rationale behind
this is that the dynamic integration of markets can affect the convergence speed
over time. This implies that any model assuming a constant convergence speed
3See Hasbrouck (1995).
4Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) record the existence of sizable price deviations for a significant
portion of the 581 ADR-underlying pairs in their study. They report discounts of up to 90% and
premia of up to 70%.
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parameter may be misspecified. Introducing a nonparametric platform liberates
us from such concerns.
In our model, we allow the convergence speed parameter to be a function
of time. Since a prior on the functional form is not needed, our model is better
suited for describing and studying the dynamic structure of the price spreads.
In fact, our results indicate that the convergence speed explicitly evolves over
time, across firms, and across countries. The time-explicit dynamics is a result of
the idiosyncratic characteristics that are stratified in terms of cross-listing firms,
home countries, home exchanges, industries, short sale availability etc.
We present the time-varying dynamics of both firm and country-specific con-
vergence speed parameters. As we test our hypotheses, we empirically verify
and visually corroborate the comparative dynamics of convergence with respect
to home market efficiency and/or completeness, time-lag effect of home ex-
changes, short sales feasibility, and ADR-listing types. Our conclusion is that
price deviations disappear faster as market efficiency measures improve over
time.
In addition, we also examine various risk factors that ADR prices face. Bin et
al. (2003) document that ADR returns are sensitive to the movements in 1. the
U.S. market; 2. the underlying home equity market; and 3. the corresponding
foreign exchange market. Analogously, we put these factors into our dynamic
structure model. The Beta coefficients on these factors can cast some light upon
the sensitivity to the aforementioned risk factors.
Several reasons other than the rapid growth experienced by the Asia-Pacific
economies over the last two decades have centered our analysis on this region’s
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ADRs. First, Asia-Pacific economies are, overall, still emerging markets. As
such, they continue to be less integrated to global capital markets. There is a
higher probability for emerging market ADRs to over- or under-react to infor-
mation regarding underlying stocks, thus a higher chance that price corrections
will ensue.
Second, in reality there are non-negligible limits to arbitrage between ADRs
and their underlying shares in Asian stock markets. This can lead to time-
resistant price disparities in some ADR-pairs. Moreover, the time-varying in-
tegration and development of the Asia-Pacific markets can further increase the
time-varying convergence speed of ADR-pairs.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2
presents a literature review; and Section 3 a concise and yet intuitive descrip-
tion of a nonparametric remedy to the existing parametric method.5 Section 4
describes the data.6 The critical hypotheses, the associated testing procedures
and the subsequent results are given in Sections 5, 6, and Appendix C.4. Section
7 ends with concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature
The existing literature exhibits a wide discussion of the arbitrage opportunities
that arise from cross-listed shares. The early phase studies—Maldonado and
Saunders (1983), Kato, Linn, and Schallheim (1991), Park and Tavokkol (1994),
Miller and Morey (1996), and Karolyi and Stulz (1996)—conclude that no arbi-
5Appendix C.3 provides a supplemental explanation of our method.
6The tables in Appendix C.2 summarize the data.
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trage opportunities exist for cross-listed shares and, thus, that they are priced in
accordance to the parity implied by the no-arbitrage condition.
However, a thread of recent work has begun to document a significant diver-
gence from the arbitrage price parity. Wahab, Lashgari, and Cohn (1992) were
among the first to report evidence of arbitrage opportunities. Froot and Dab-
ora (1999) study the pricing of a few dually-listed corporations (Royal Dutch
and Shell, and Unilever N.V. and Unilever PLC) and find sizable and significant
price deviations from the arbitrage parity. For a recent and complete summary
of the literature see Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). The latter two authors find siz-
able price deviations for a significant portion of the 581 ADR-underlying pairs
analyzed in their study. They report discounts of up to 90% and premiums of
up to 70%.
Accepting the evidence that price deviations may exist temporarily, or even
persistently, numerous papers have attempted to explain the phenomenon by
adopting novel models that capture the dynamic structure of the spread. For
example, Kim, Szakmary, and Mathur (2000) use Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods to analyze the adjustment
of ADR-implied prices. Eun and Sabberwal (2003) employ an Error Correction
Model (ECM) to explore the convergence of arbitrage parity prices for more than
60 Canadian stocks cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). There
are also many studies that try to explain the existence of a large price spread.
Melvin (2003) and August et al. (2004) document that capital flow restrictions
wield significant influence over arbitrage price parity with greater intensity dur-
ing periods of economic and currency turmoil.
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Considering the fact that the speed of convergence may differ depending on
how far the prices are from the steady state, nonlinear models have been em-
ployed to describe the dynamic structure of price spreads. Surpassing the limi-
tations of linear models, nonlinear formulations make more sense in capturing
the time-varying property of price spreads. Early works such as Michael et al.
(1997) and Taylor et al. (2001) apply Amplitude-Dependent Exponential Autore-
gressive (EXPAR) models to study the speed of adjustment of foreign exchange
rates to the purchasing power parity (PPP). Nonlinear models have also been
employed to examine the convergence speed of ADR price spreads. Rabinovitch
et al. (2003) study an ECM model reflecting nonlinear dynamic adjustments for
twenty Chilean and Argentine ADR-pairs.
Koumkwa and Susmel (2005) analyze a sample of twenty one Mexican
shares dually listed in the U.S., where both cross-border markets lie within the
same time zone. They employ the Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregres-
sive (ESTAR) model with appropriate model selection criteria and find that price
deviations are more or less short-lived. For 15 of the 21 pairs they studied, it
took one trading day for the ADR-implied price spread to reduce by 50% (half-
life). For some of the firms, half-lives of greater than four days were attributed
to the low average daily trading volume. They report that their migration from
the existing linear analytics to a nonlinear alternative reduces the mean half-life
by down to circa 60%. Thus, the linear models are deemed to have exaggerated
the arbitrage opportunities.
However, it is more art than science to determine the parametric specifica-
tion of a nonlinear model. That is why we turn to nonparametrics, in which
functional forms are not required a priori. See Fan and Yao’s (2003) treatment of
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nonparametric time series models.
3.3 Model
As a starting point, we express the ADR price Dt as Dt = αt + S t · Et · k + η t =
αt + D˜t + ηt, where (1) S t is the daily-closing price of the home exchange stock
known at time t; 2. Et is the foreign exchange rate at time t; (3) k is the host-
home exchange ratio; thus (4) D˜t = S t ·Et ·k is the price adjusted for the exchange
rate and its bundling ratio; (5) ηt is the stochastic term that follows a martingale
so that E
[
η|Ft] = 0, where Ft is the past information σ−algebra; and (6) αt is the
ADR premium (positive) or discount (negative) and equals zero if the market is
efficient.7
Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) propose a time series model to see whether cross-
border equity market shocks and foreign exchange market shocks can explain
movements of the price spread. They incorporate first-order autoregression in
the model to determine whether there is a mean reversion component. We ex-
tend their model by allowing the coefficient for the first lagged term to be a
function of time. The rationale behind this is that the dynamic integration of
markets can affect the convergence speed over time. We only consider the first-
order lagged term of relative ADR premium under a Markov chain assumption
controlling for the return on home/host equity and foreign exchange markets.
In the nonparametric spirit, for an ADR-pair i, our model can be described as
DRi(t) = αi + θi(t) DRi(t − 1) +
1∑
j=−1
βUSj R
US
M (t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βHj R
H
M(t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βFXj RFX(t + j) + εi(t),
7αt may reflect a momentum effect, thus it can be modeled in a time series context as a
component of the price spread Dt − D˜t.
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where (1) DRi(t) ≡ Di(t)−D˜i(t)D˜i(t) is the relative price spread, or relative ADR premium
8;
2. θi(t) is a coefficient function that measures the convergence speed of the price
spread: the closer the absolute value of the parameter to one, the slower the
convergence. As the control variables, 3. RUSM is the return on U.S. host market
index; (4) RHM is the return on home market index; and (5) RFX is the return on
foreign exchange rate. We consider the distributed effect of three consecutive
trading days around day t following Gagnon and Karolyi (2004).
Our model is a partial varying-coefficient model. Fan and Huang (2005)
provide a local polynomial estimation for constant parameters, β’s, and the co-
efficient function, θi(t). See Appendix C.3 for further details.
3.4 Data
We used the Bank of New York Mellon’s ADR directory webpage9 to locate and
collect 400 pairs of ADRs and their underlying stocks for cross-listed firms based
in the Asia-Pacific economies. Spanning January 2000 through December 2005,
the daily closing prices of these stocks were sourced from Thompson Financial
Datastream and The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). In order to
maximize the number of overlapping trading days, we chose the latter-half of
the data—January 2003 through December 2005—and thus reduced the ADR-
pairs down to 320. Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 summarize the data used in this
study.10
8A further refinement is the minimum relative spread which we actually use in the nonpara-
metric estimation procedure. See Section 3 or Appendix C.3 for further discussion.
9URL: http://www.adrbny.com/dr directory.jsp
10The hierarchy of the dataset is organized as follows (1) ADRs Sheet for ADR prices of Asia-
Pacific firms; 2. Underlying Shares Sheet for the corresponding underlying share prices; 3. Foreign
Exchange Sheet for home-U.S.$ exchange rates defined per U.S. dollar; (4) Index Sheet for U.S.
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Table C.1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample, which covers 15 Asia-
Pacific countries including large economies like China, Japan, India, and Ko-
rea. Among them, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia account for the majority of
ADRs—up to 70% of the matched sample. We categorized ADRs according to the
U.S. host exchanges and the associated stock indices. Additionally, we summa-
rized ADR-pairs according to their industry, short sale availability, MSCI market
category, and trading time difference. Table C.2 shows a profile of selected Asia-
Pacific ADR-pairs and Table C.3 summarizes the characteristics of the regional
stock exchanges.
As our key quantities of interest, 1. Shortsell is defined as a dummy variable
equal to one if short sales are allowed in a specific country and zero otherwise11;
2. MSCI equals to one if a country belongs to the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital
International) Developed Markets (DM) index, or zero if MSCI Emerging Mar-
kets (EM) index: it is used as a proxy for market efficiency or completeness of
the home markets in the Asia-Pacific region; and 3. Time Difference is the posi-
tive number of time difference between the closing time of the home exchange
and the opening time of host exchanges in New York.12
Previous studies on ADR price spread such as Eun and Sabherwal (2003),
Grammig et al. (2005), and Ding et al. (1999) use high frequency data to en-
sure the simultaneity of observed prices in the cross-border markets. There are
overlapping trading hours among the host and home markets in their analyses,
and home market indices; and (5) Master Sheet for a fact sheet of all ADRs under our analysis
which contains information regarding Datastream codes for ADR-pairs, ADR-listing types, home
exchanges, home-market indices, U.S. market indices, countries, foreign exchange rates, time
differences, short sale availability and MSCI indices.
11We obtained this data from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2003).
12A related Timezone variable was first introduced by Gagnon and Karolyi (2004): they ob-
tained it from the World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org) al-
beit they use the number of time zones between the home and host exchanges.
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and thus inferring from quote behavior is critical in a synchronous trade setting.
However, as our data spans across Asia-Pacific markets, there are no overlap-
ping trading hours with U.S. host exchanges. For this reason, we believe that
the daily frequency of data is sufficient for the purpose of our analysis.
For a daily closing price PHi (t) in the home market, we can define a price
spread by either PUSi (t)−PHi (t) or PUSi (t−1)−PHi (t). Thus, the relative price spread
can be defined in the two following ways: 1. DRi(t) ≡
(
PUSi (t) − PHi (t)
)
/PHi (t),
which is the same-calendar day causality from an Asia-Pacific market to a U.S.
market; and (2) DRi(t)′ ≡
(
PUSi (t − 1) − PHi (t)
)
/PHi (t), which is the reversed causal-
ity from the U.S. exchange to the Asia-Pacific exchange.
Figure C.1 shows the nonparametric kernel density plots of the two relative
price spreads for six randomly selected firms. In the plots, the dotted lines are
the kernel probability density functions for DRi(t) and the solid lines are those
of DRi(t)′. The bold solid line is the minimum of the two relative spreads, which
is defined as D˜Ri(t)  min {DRi(t),DRi(t)′} .13
From Figure C.1, we can see that the dotted kernel density plots usually
exhibit higher kurtosis with narrower dispersion than the solid counterparts.
Thus, we can intuitively infer that the underlying stock prices of Asia-Pacific
markets lead ADR prices sequentially, rather than the latter predicts the former.
This result confirms the conclusion of Hasbrouck (1995), Lieberman et al. (1999),
and Su and Chong (2007).14 The minimum spread, by definition, reflects the nar-
13See Appendix C.3 for a detailed explanation on the minimum relative spread.
14Lieberman et al. (1999) examine the price behavior of six firms cross-listed on Israel and
U.S. exchanges with daily closing prices. They demonstrate that the effect of Israeli market on
the share prices in the U.S. is stronger than the it in the reversed direction. Su and Chong (2007)
study the contribution to price discovery for Chinese cross-listed stocks, which is a subset of
our sample. They find that the stock prices of two exchanges, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the Hong Kong Stocks Exchange (HKSE) are co-integrated and mutually-adjusting, but the
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rowest and yet “pickiest” distribution. Since we study the mutual convergence
between pair-wise markets, we use the minimum relative spread, D˜Ri(t), which
captures symmetric convergence.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Convergence speed parameters
Using a nonparametric kernel estimation,15 we obtained the coefficient function
θi(t) for each ADR-pair in the sample. Figure C.2 shows the results for six ran-
domly selected pairs. We find that θi(t)s change over time within the sample
period—which further confirms the justification of our nonparametric setting
with time-varying convergence speed parameters. A downward-sloping θi(t)
indicates that the convergence accelerates as market efficiency and/or informa-
tion quality improves. There are some pairs with upward-sloping θi(t)s and they
show that the associated conditions for market efficiency worsened throughout
the period.
What is more intriguing is the result of the market and country-wise av-
erage convergence speed. Figure C.3 exhibits the country-level dynamics of
ADRs convergence parameters. Most countries—Australia, China, Hong Kong
etc.—exhibit decreasing θi(t)s where market efficiency gained positive momen-
tum. It appears that, nonetheless, some Southeast Asian countries—Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand—show non-decreasing θi(t)s. This suggests that over
HKSE contributes about 80% to price discovery, more than the NYSE does.
15See Appendix C.3.
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the sample period their markets were slow to integrating to the U.S. equity mar-
kets. It can be attributed to the shift in economic regimes following the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. Regional governments implemented market reg-
ulatory policies, such as capital flow restrictions, short sale restrictions, and for-
eign ownership ceilings, that undermined undermine market efficiency.
Figure C.4 (placed after Figure C.5 due to space allocation) shows the over-
lapping comparative dynamics chart of convergence speed for several selected
countries. As the chart indicates, Pakistan is dominated by Thailand, which is in
turn dominated by Korea. Australia’s dominance over Korea is valid from De-
cember 2003 to July 2005. The results are not counter-intuitive. We also compare
the convergence speed parameters by home exchanges in Figure C.5.
Figures C.6 and C.7 delineate the convergence speed of different ADR-listing
types or exchanges. The 144A private placements are the slowest in conver-
gence, if ever, and they are dominated by the Level I “pink sheet” OTC (over-
the-counter) ADRs, then successively by the Level II/III ADRs listed on the NAS-
DAQ and the NYSE as expected—given the latter being relatively superior to the
former in terms of information quality and trading volume. The parameters of
time-varying convergence speed, categorized by the availability of short sales,
are presented in Figure C.8. It is apparent that, the convergence speed of ADR-
pairs which are associated with home exchanges/countries where short sales
are allowed and practiced significantly dominate those which are not.
The visual evidence presented hitherto may be insufficient draw a final con-
clusion; thus, we corroborate our argument with statistical significance tests
based on the key quantities of interest. We hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis I. The lack of short sales in some exchanges decelerates the con-
vergence speed.16
Hypothesis II. The ADRs of emerging or less developed economies offer more
arbitrage opportunities17 than those of developed economies based on MSCI
categories.
Hypothesis III. The higher the time difference between the home exchange
and the host U.S. exchange is, the faster the convergence speed.18
We use t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test.19 We can formalize the first
hypothesis as H0 : θno short(t) = θshort(t) vs. H1 : θno short(t) > θshort(t). Define
the difference between nonparametric parameter estimates as d(t) ≡ θ̂no short(t) −
θ̂short(t). The t-test statistic is t0 ≡ d(t)− 0s.e.(d(t))  0.1570− 00.0080 = 19.7040. Moreover, the
Wilcoxon-test statistic20 is of 1325 with a 2.813 × 10−10 p-value. Both the t-test
and the Wilcoxon test significantly confirm that the availability of short sales
can speed up convergence.
We now test the second hypothesis as H0 : θEM(t) = θDM(t) vs. H1 : θEM(t) >
θDM(t). Define the difference between nonparametric parameter estimates as
d(t) ≡ θ̂EM(t) − θ̂DM(t). The t-test result is t0 ≡ d(t)− 0s.e.(d(t))  0.2085− 00.0070 = 29.6419,
and yet another noticeably significant Wilcoxon-test statistic is obtained as
V0 = 1326 with a p-value = 2.651 × 10−10.
16That is, increase the convergence parameter.
17That is, the absolute value of convergence parameters will be higher and closer to one.
18In other words, the earlier the home market closes, the quicker the ADR finds price discovery
during the trading hours of host exchanges in New York City. This hypothesis is based on the
belief that as information chronologically accumulates for an underlying share, its ADR must
reflect more precisely the implied-value, yielding a fewer arbitrage opportunities by the closing
time of the host market in N.Y.C.
19It is a nonparametric test to compare two samples. See Wilcoxon (1945) and Appendix C.4.
20The Wilcoxon test-statistic is defined as V0 ≡ ∑{t} 1{d(t)>0} · ρt, where ρt is the rank of {|d(t)|}{t}.
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Both tests show that the developed markets have a higher speed of conver-
gence. The time-varying parameters of convergence speed, categorized by MSCI
Developed (DM) and Emerging Market (EM), resemble those classified accord-
ing to the availability of short sales. (See Figure C.9.) This is because most con-
stituent countries of the MSCI DM index allow short sale. This supports empir-
ically and graphically our conviction that the countries with enhanced market
efficiency or completeness , as proxied by MSCI indices, exhibit lower conver-
gence parameters, which in turn yield quicker convergence to the parity.
Next, we want to see the effect of trading time differences. Figure C.10 sum-
marizes the time-difference effect on convergence speed. The trading-time dif-
ference between the U.S. and home markets affects the ability of arbitrageurs
forcing convergence between an ADR and the underlying share prices. When
trading sessions overlap, cross-listed pairs are priced almost synchronously
making it easier for investors to implement pairs-trade effectively. Overall, the
earlier the home exchange closes prior to the ADR market in New York City, the
faster the convergence speed becomes—measured within the trading hours of
ADR exchanges. We test the third hypothesis as H0 : θlater(t) = θearlier(t) vs. H1 :
θlater(t) > θearlier(t). Define the difference between nonparametric parameter esti-
mates as d(t) ≡ θ̂later(t) − θ̂earlier(t).
Table C.4 summarizes the cross-test statistics of the parametric differences
between home markets of later and earlier closing times prior to the opening
of N.Y.C. host markets. The home exchanges in the horizontal time intervals
close earlier than the home exchanges in the vertical slots. All t-test statistics
are significant at a 1% right-side significance level denoted by two asterisks.
Again, the exceedingly significant Wilcoxon-test statistics are presented with
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their corresponding p-values.
3.5.2 Betas
Bin et al. (2003) document that ADR returns are sensitive to fluctuations in 1. the
U.S. market, 2. the underlying home equity market, and 3. the corresponding
foreign exchange market. Let us invoke our model specification again.
D˜Ri(t) = αi + θi(t) D˜Ri(t − 1) +
1∑
j=−1
βUSj R
US
M (t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βHj R
H
M(t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βFXj RFX(t + j) + εi(t).
As the plots in Figure C.11 show, most countries exhibit positive and nega-
tive risk exposure toward home and U.S. indices respectively. These results are
in line with those of Gagnon and Karolyi (2004).21
As expected, the foreign exchange risk exposure of the ADR spread, βFX, de-
pends on exchange rate regimes. For the countries whose foreign exchange beta
paths are nearly flat about zero, three out of four—China (pegged), Hong Kong
(pegged), Singapore (managed float) and Taiwan (fully float)—maintain either
pegged or managed-float exchange rate regime as shown in Table C.3.
For the fully-float regimes, the signs of the foreign exchange risk exposure
are mixed. Australia and Japan exhibit pronounced positive effects from ex-
change rates exceeding the effects from home and host exchange indices. A
positive beta of foreign exchange exposure (βFX) implies that a positive return
of the exchange rate (RFX)—depreciation in the home currency against the U.S.
dollar—poses an upside for the relative ADR spread.22
21This could provide us ground to applying the difference between RUSM and R
H
M in the model
specification rather than separating them.
22DRi(t) ≡ P
US
i (t)−PHi (t)
PHi (t)
.
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Should the market expect that the currency continues to depreciate such that
the positive sign momentum will persist, the relative spread will carry a pre-
mium. The ADR will then out-value the price implied by the underlying share.
This excess spread—cross-listing premium—is rational since the market reflects
the view that the U.S. dollar will appreciate against home currency.
Yet, India shows a negative exchange rate beta even though it is a fully-float
currency regime. This is an interesting phenomenon that may be related to cur-
rency strengthening. Investors expect the Indian rupee to appreciate, thus mod-
erate exchange rate perturbations do not significantly and negatively affect on
the spreads. They are dominantly considered temporary jitters that are expected
to revert to the trend quickly.
Thus, a depreciation will be considered short-lived, to be followed by a quick
trend-reversion. That is why there is a discount component in Indian ADRs from
a currency risk perspective. The Chinese renminbi (RMB) may have behaved
similarly as a member of the Chindia Leagues, had China not pegged its currency
against the Greenback.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the convergence of the prices of American Deposi-
tary Receipts (ADRs) listed by Asia-Pacific firms and their original shares listed
on home exchanges in various time zones. Instead of conventional paramet-
ric approaches that carry embedded model-specification errors, we adopted a
nonparametric technique to estimate the convergence speed parameter of the
existing parametric specification.
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We presented the dynamics of both firm and country-specific time-varying
convergence speed parameters. We empirically verified and visually corrobo-
rated the comparative dynamics of the convergence with respect to the home
market efficiency/completeness, time-lag of home exchanges, availability of
short sales on the home exchanges, and ADR-listing types. Given these circum-
stances and due to practical constraints, the limits of arbitrage cannot serve as
a counterexample of market efficiency. We conclude that, as an alternative an-
swer, the speed of convergence accelerates as proposed market efficiency mea-
sures are enhanced.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 OF APPENDIX
A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Sample of Canadian firms listed on both the TSX and the NYSE
The PIN is the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara,
and Paperman (1996). The bid-ask spreads are defined: 1. SPREADNYSE ≡
askNYSE − bidNYSE
(askNYSE + bidNYSE)/2
; and 2. SPREADTSX ≡ askTSX − bidTSX(askTSX + bidTSX)/2 . The information share (IS) is
exchange-specific relative contribution to price discovery of a security traded on
multiple exchanges, following Hasbrouck (1995, 2007). All values are arithmetic
means of monthly estimates through the sample period: January 1, 1998, through
December 31, 2000.
Company PIN NYSE Spread NYSE IS NYSE PIN TSX Spread TSX IS TSX
Abitibi‐Consolidated, Inc. 0.151 0.018 41.7% 0.184 0.005 58.3%
Advantage Energy Income Fund 0.372 0.117 50.0% 0.482 0.131 50.0%
Agnico‐Eagle Mines Limited 0.188 0.026 50.0% 0.421 0.080 50.0%
Agrium Inc. 0.190 0.020 43.0% 0.202 0.007 57.0%
Alcan Inc. 0.147 0.006 40.7% 0.169 0.003 59.3%
Bank of Nova Scotia 0.234 0.063 49.9% 0.188 0.003 50.1%
Barrick Gold Corporation 0.190 0.008 38.6% 0.215 0.003 61.4%
BCE Inc. 0.112 0.006 49.1% 0.174 0.002 50.9%
Biovail Corporation 0.181 0.008 49.5% 0.220 0.006 50.5%
BMO Financial Group 0.160 0.007 41.4% 0.204 0.002 58.6%
Brookfield Properties Corporation 0.267 0.020 45.3% 0.226 0.016 54.7%
Cameco Corporation 0.223 0.020 38.0% 0.197 0.009 62.0%
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 0.308 0.017 49.9% 0.160 0.002 50.1%
Canadian National Railway Company 0.139 0.007 48.4% 0.215 0.003 51.6%
Canadian Pacific Railway Limited 0.206 0.007 43.8% 0.173 0.003 56.2%
Canwest Global Communications 0.287 0.023 47.3% 0.295 0.016 52.7%
Celestica Inc. 0.186 0.010 44.4% 0.225 0.005 55.6%
CGI Group Inc. 0.195 0.028 49.9% 0.280 0.018 50.1%
Compton Petroleum Corporation 0.110 0.010 50.0% 0.253 0.023 50.0%
Corus Entertainment, Inc. 0.311 0.016 46.0% 0.210 0.012 54.0%
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Table A.1 (Continued)
Company PIN NYSE Spread NYSE IS NYSE PIN TSX Spread TSX IS TSX
Cott Corporation 0.147 0.012 50.0% 0.223 0.014 50.0%
Domtar Corporation 0.199 0.010 50.0% 0.206 0.007 50.0%
Encana Corporation 0.311 0.054 39.3% 0.291 0.019 60.7%
Energy Metals Corporation 0.203 0.059 50.0% 0.274 0.047 50.0%
Enerplus Resources Fund 0.261 0.020 46.2% 0.286 0.019 53.8%
Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited 0.308 0.012 50.0% 0.254 0.007 50.0%
Four Seasons Hotels Inc. 0.202 0.009 46.5% 0.214 0.009 53.5%
Gildan Activewear Inc. 0.239 0.019 83.6% 0.800 0.018 16.4%
Goldcorp Inc. 0.354 0.072 41.4% 0.178 0.011 58.6%
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. 0.246 0.020 40.8% 0.277 0.014 59.2%
IPSCO Inc. 0.301 0.027 48.7% 0.215 0.010 51.3%
Kinross Gold Corporation 0.247 0.059 44.8% 0.231 0.012 55.2%
Magna International Inc. 0.153 0.006 42.6% 0.179 0.004 57.4%
Manulife Financial Corp. 0.223 0.011 41.4% 0.222 0.031 58.6%
MDS Inc. 0.218 0.024 33.8% 0.323 0.038 66.2%
Meridian Gold Inc. 0.205 0.042 42.7% 0.267 0.019 57.3%
Nexen, Inc. 0.168 0.014 44.9% 0.160 0.004 55.1%
Nortel Networks Corporation 0.205 0.006 47.9% 0.188 0.002 52.1%
NOVA Chemicals Corporation 0.245 0.015 38.8% 0.275 0.006 61.2%
Pengrowth Energy Trust 0.247 0.025 49.2% 0.183 0.007 50.8%
Petro‐Canada 0.238 0.017 42.5% 0.196 0.004 57.5%
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. 0.128 0.007 44.2% 0.170 0.005 55.8%
Precision Drilling Trust 0.167 0.011 36.5% 0.190 0.005 63.5%
Quebecor World, Inc. 0.230 0.013 45.4% 0.183 0.004 54.6%
RBC Financial Group 0.163 0.007 46.3% 0.173 0.002 53.7%
Rogers Communications Inc. 0.179 0.017 37.4% 0.238 0.006 62.6%
Shaw Communications Inc. 0.195 0.012 49.2% 0.187 0.007 50.8%
Stantec Inc. 0.158 0.010 50.0% 0.394 0.020 50.0%
Suncor Energy Inc. 0.185 0.010 47.4% 0.184 0.004 52.6%
Talisman Energy Inc. 0.190 0.013 39.4% 0.164 0.005 60.6%
TELUS Corporation 0.199 0.014 43.0% 0.228 0.005 57.0%
The Thomson Corporation 0.290 0.034 49.6% 0.175 0.005 50.4%
Tim Hortons Inc. 0.202 0.017 50.0% 0.536 0.124 50.0%
Toronto‐Dominion Bank 0.152 0.010 26.0% 0.203 0.002 74.0%
TransAlta Corporation 0.308 0.081 49.9% 0.180 0.005 50.1%
TransCanada Corporation 0.157 0.012 48.6% 0.211 0.004 51.4%
Mean 0.214 0.022 45.6% 0.242 0.015 54.4%
Median 0.202 0.015 46.1% 0.213 0.007 53.9%
Standard Deviation 0.060 0.022 7.2% 0.107 0.025 7.2%
75
Table A.2: Relative premiums of cross-listings on the NYSE
For a TSX-NYSE cross-listed pair, the relative premium (≡ (pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX) is the
percentage premium earned on the NYSE-listed stock against the original listing
traded on the TSX, adjusted for the U.S.-Canada exchange rate. The summary
statistics in Panel A are based on ten-minute frequency prices 56 cross-listed pairs
through the sample period: January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2000. The PIN is
the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paper-
man (1996). (PINTSX − PINNYSE) is the difference in the monthly PINs on the TSX-
and the NYSE-listed pairs, respectively. The observations in Panel B are in firm-
months through the sample period: January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2000.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, follow-
ing Newey and West (1987, 1994). The numerical value in the parentheses below
the estimate is a t-statistic. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on
two-sided student-t tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics of relative premiums
Mean Median Standard Deviation
(pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX 0.00306 0.00004 0.03031
Panel B: Relative premiums against cross-border difference in the PIN
(pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX = β (PINTSX − PINNYSE) + 
Estimate No. of Obs. Adj. R2
(PINTSX − PINNYSE) 1.087∗∗∗ 1,591 0.176
(3.259)
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Table A.3: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
The PIN is the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara,
and Paperman (1996). The bid-ask spreads are defined as: 1. SPREADNYSE ≡
askNYSE − bidNYSE
(askNYSE + bidNYSE)/2
; and 2. SPREADTSX ≡ askTSX − bidTSX(askTSX + bidTSX)/2 . The information share is
exchange-specific relative contribution to price discovery of a security traded on
multiple exchanges, following Hasbrouck (1995, 2007). The Wilcoxon signed-rank
test is a non-parametric pair-wise comparison test, following Wilcoxon (1945). The
coordinates (i, t) denote each firm and each month, respectively. d is a differential
measure defined for the estimates of each quantity of interest. They are defined as:
1. d(i, t) ≡ PINTSX(i, t) − PINNYSE(i, t); 2. d(i, t) ≡ SPREADNYSE(i, t) − SPREADTSX(i, t);
and 3. d(i, t) ≡ ISTSX(i, t) − ISNYSE(i, t). The Wilcoxon test-statistic is defined as:
V0 ≡ ∑{(i,t)} 1{d(i,t)>0} · ρit, where ρit is the rank of {|d(i, t)|}.
PIN Spread Information Share
H0 PINTSX = PINNYSE SPREADTSX = SPREADNYSE ISTSX = ISNYSE
H1 PINTSX > PINNYSE SPREADNYSE > SPREADTSX ISTSX > ISNYSE
d PINTSX(i, t) − PINNYSE(i, t) SPREADNYSE(i, t) − SPREADTSX(i, t) ISTSX(i, t) − ISNYSE(i, t)
V0 424250 680698 2926092
p-value 0.001458 < 2.2 × 10−16 < 2.2 × 10−16
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Table A.4: Fixed-effect panel regressions
The panel dataset is constructed with columns of company symbol, monthly date,
TSX indicator, and monthly estimates of the PIN, spread, information share, and
volume, following Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977), and van Dyk and Meng
(2001). On the TSX and the NYSE, for each cross-lister (i) and in each month (t), Jan-
uary 1998 through December 2000, 1. PIN is the probability of informed trading,
following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996); 2. SPREAD is the relative
quoted spread; 3. the information share (IS) is exchange-specific relative contri-
bution to price discovery of a security traded on multiple exchanges, following
Hasbrouck (1995, 2007); 4. VOLUME is the log of total daily trading volume; and 5.
TSX equals one if the estimated numerical value is of the TSX, or zero if the NYSE.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following
Newey and West (1987, 1994). The numerical values in the parentheses below the
estimates are t-statistics. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on
two-sided student-t tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observa-
tions are in firm-months.
Panel A: PIN = β0 + β1 SPREAD + β2 IS + β3 VOLUME + β4 TSX + 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 0.161∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(10.120) (3.301)
SPREAD 1.938∗∗∗ 2.043∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗
(22.908) (23.632) (20.848)
IS 0.043∗∗∗ 0.017∗
(5.550) (1.655)
VOLUME −0.000 0.021∗∗∗ 0.003
(−0.086) (33.774) (1.234)
TSX Dummy 0.026∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(6.525) (4.124)
Company & Month Effects No No Yes
No. of Obs. 3, 960 3, 960 3, 960
Adj. R2 0.118 0.855 0.184
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Table A.4 (Continued)
Panel B: SPREAD = β0 + β1 PIN + β2 IS + β3 VOLUME + β4 TSX + 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −0.008∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(−2.723) (4.219)
PIN 0.064∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(22.908) (23.632) (20.848)
IS −0.016∗∗∗ −0.002
(−12.191) (−1.231)
VOLUME 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(7.229) (10.019) (5.314)
TSX Dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(−12.374) (−3.983)
Company & Month Effects No No Yes
No. of Obs. 3, 960 3, 960 3, 960
Adj. R2 0.155 0.582 0.369
Panel C: IS = β0 + β1 PIN + β2 SPREAD + β3 VOLUME + β4 TSX + 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(15.162) (9.696)
PIN 0.179∗∗∗ 0.098∗
(5.550) (1.655)
SPREAD −2.196∗∗∗ −0.175 0.038
(−12.191) (−1.231) (0.280)
VOLUME 0.002 0.049∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.651) (62.986) (−7.150)
TSX Dummy 0.260∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(57.344) (12.167)
Company & Month Effects No No Yes
No. of Obs. 3, 960 3, 960 3, 960
Adj. R2 0.036 0.919 0.561
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Table A.5: Cross-sectional regressions
For each cross-listed pair (i), SPEEDCONV (≡ θi) measures the reciprocal speed of the
parity-convergence of relative premium, following Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2009a)
empirical model:
DRi(t) = αi + θi DRi(t−1)+
1∑
j=−1
βUSj R
US
M (t+ j)+
1∑
j=−1
βCj R
C
M(t+ j)+
1∑
j=−1
βFXj RFX(t+ j)+ εi(t).
The daily relative premium
(
DRi(t) ≡
(
PUSi (t) − PCi (t)
)
/PCi (t)
)
can be explained by 1.
its own lag (DRi(t − 1)) associated with 2. the convergence speed parameter (θi): the
closer the absolute value to zero, the faster the convergence to parity; and lag-
distributed (yesterday ( j = −1), today ( j = 0), and tomorrow ( j = +1)) returns on 3.
the S&P 500 Index
(
RUSM (t + j)
)
, 4. the S&P TSX Composite Index
(
RCM(t + j)
)
, and 5.
the Canada-U.S. exchange rate return (RFX(t + j)), a positive RFX implies a depreci-
ation in the Canadian dollar. The forward-lag is due to information leakages and
market impact. The remaining variables are: 1. PINAVG is the arithmetic average
of the PINs of the pair on the TSX and the NYSE; 2. SPREADAVG is the arithmetic
average of the bid-ask spreads of the pair on the TSX and the NYSE; 3. SIZE is the
proxy of normalized firm size and defined as the average log market capitalization
on the TSX and the NYSE; 4. INDUSTRY equals one if the cross-lister is a manufac-
turing firm, or zero otherwise; 5. VOLUME is the log of total daily trading volume;
6. GOVERNANCE is the Report on Business governance index of Canadian firms
published by Globe and Mail (McFarland (2002)); 7. (pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX is the rela-
tive premium on the NYSE-listed stock; and 8. (PINTSX − PINNYSE) is the difference
of the PINs of the pair on the TSX and the NYSE. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Newey and West (1987, 1994).
The numerical values in the parentheses below the estimates are t-statistics. ***, **,
and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided student-t tests at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in firm-months.
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Table A.5 (Continued)
Panel A: Cross-sectional determinants of the convergence speed parameter of
cross-listed pairs
SPEEDCONV = γ1 PINAVG +γ2 SPREADAVG +γ3 SIZE+γ4 INDUSTRY+γ5 VOLUME+γ6 GOVERNANCE+η
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PIN 1.281∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗
(4.845) (3.604) (5.162) (3.060)
SPREAD 4.606∗ 3.034 1.828
(1.821) (1.487) (0.466)
SIZE 0.021 −0.006 −0.074 0.073
(0.207) (−0.049) (−0.537) (0.706)
INDUSTRY −0.165∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(−3.436) (−2.952) (−3.203) (−3.254)
VOLUME 0.406∗∗ 0.483∗∗ 0.324
(2.134) (2.568) (1.200)
GOVERNANCE −0.001
(−0.445)
No. of Obs. 1, 591 1, 591 1, 591 1, 591
Adj. R2 0.606 0.635 0.629 0.557
Panel B: Cross-sectional determinants of cross-border average spread
SPREADAVG = δ1 PINAVG + δ2 SPEEDCONV + δ3 SIZE + δ4 INDUSTRY + 
PINAVG SPEEDCONV SIZE INDUSTRY
Estimate 0.074∗∗ 0.018∗∗ −0.021∗ −0.002
(2.359) (2.548) (−1.876) (−0.289)
No. of Obs. 1, 591
Adj. R2 0.625
Panel C: Cross-sectional determinants of relative premiums
(pNYSE − pTSX) /pTSX = β1 (PINTSX − PINNYSE) + β2 SPEEDCONV + β3 GOVERNANCE + 
PINTSX − PINNYSE SPEEDCONV GOVERNANCE
Estimate 0.849∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ −0.0003
(4.125) (2.669) (−0.980)
No. of Obs. 1, 591
Adj. R2 0.380
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Table A.6: Test of exchange-specific liquidity skewness
˜SPREADNT is the percentage cross-border arbitrage profit from buying on the TSX
and selling on the NYSE, and ˜SPREADTN is from buying on the NYSE and selloing
on the TSX. They are defined as:
• ˜SPREADNT ≡ {askNYSE − bidTSX · (US$/CAN$)ask} / {bidTSX · (US$/CAN$)ask} ,
• ˜SPREADTN ≡ {askTSX · (US$/CAN$)bid − bidNYSE} /bidNYSE.
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric pair-wise comparison test, fol-
lowing Wilcoxon (1945). The coordinates (i, t) denote each firm and each month,
respectively. d is a differential measure defined as: d(i, t) ≡ SPREADTN(i, t) −
SPREADNT(i, t). The Wilcoxon test-statistic is defined as: V0 ≡ ∑{(i,t)} 1{d(i,t)>0} · ρit,
where ρit is the rank of {|d(i, t)|}.
H0 ˜SPREADNT = ˜SPREADTN
H1 ˜SPREADNT , ˜SPREADTN
d ˜SPREADNT(i, t) − ˜SPREADTN(i, t)
V0 507568
p-value 0.9407
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Table A.7: Cross-listings on the NYSE by TSX-listed firms, 1998 through
2000
The PIN is the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara,
and Paperman (1996). The bid-ask spreads are defined as: 1. SPREADNYSE ≡
askNYSE − bidNYSE
(askNYSE + bidNYSE)/2
; and 2. SPREADTSX ≡ askTSX − bidTSX(askTSX + bidTSX)/2 . When estimating the cumu-
lative abnormal return (CAR) around a cross-listing on the NYSE, 1. the market
model uses the S&P TSX Composite Index as the market return through the pre-
run-up period ([−250,−11]) prior to the cross-listing; then 2. the product of “gross”
residuals within an event window is subtracted by one to yield the CAR.
g g
Company Industry TSX Code TSX Listing NYSE Code NYSE Listing  Listing Sequence 
Celestica Inc. Electrical and Electronic Products CLS 7 07, 1998 CLS 6 30, 1998 NYSE → TSX
Shaw Communications Inc. Communications & Media SJR.B 3 25, 1983 SJR 7 01, 1998 TSX → NYSE
NOVA Chemicals Corporation Chemicals NCX 7 03, 1998 NCX 7 06, 1998 TSX → NYSE
CGI Group Inc. Consulting GIB.A 4 21, 1992 GIB 10 07, 1998 TSX → NYSE
Brookfield Properties Corporation Property Management and Investment BPO 6 27, 1985 BPO 6 02, 1999 TSX → NYSE
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. Packaging and Containers ITP 1 06, 1993 ITP 8 16, 1999 TSX → NYSE
Gildan Activewear Inc. Household Goods GIL 6 24, 1998 GIL 9 01, 1999 TSX → NYSE
Manulife Financial Corp. Insurance MFC 9 30, 1999 MFC 9 24, 1999 NYSE → TSX
Sun Life Financial, Inc. Insurance SLF 3 29, 2000 SLF 3 23, 2000 NYSE → TSX
MDS Inc. Medical Services MDS 6 25, 1973 MDZ 4 07, 2000 TSX → NYSE
Corus Entertainment, Inc. Entertainment Services CJR.B 9 03, 1999 CJR 5 10, 2000 TSX → NYSE
Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd. Oil and Gas Producers CNQ 5 14, 1976 CNQ 7 31, 2000 TSX → NYSE
TELUS Corporation Telephone Utilities T.A 2 01, 1999 TU 10 17, 2000 TSX → NYSE
Nexen, Inc. Oil and Gas Producers NXY 7 14, 1971 NXY 11 14, 2000 TSX → NYSE
Enerplus Resources Fund*** Oil and Gas Producers ERF.UN 3 11, 1987 ERF 11 17, 2000 TSX → NYSEg g
Company ‐3M +3M ‐6M +6M Before After ‐3M +3M ‐6M +6M Before After
Celestica Inc. 0.186 
Shaw Communications Inc. 0.237 0.164 
NOVA Chemicals Corporation 0.329   0.326 0.329 0.268  0.006   0.007   0.006   0.007   0.006   0.007    
CGI Group Inc. 0.183   0.283 0.176 0.277 0.256 0.226  0.268   0.151   0.181   0.123   0.150   0.055    
Brookfield Properties Corporation 0.223 0.206 0.068 0.194  0.020   0.017   0.069   0.016    
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. 0.218   0.247 0.209 0.209 0.266 0.262  0.034   0.025   0.026   0.025   0.027   0.031    
Gildan Activewear Inc.
Manulife Financial Corp. 0.035 0.150  0.003   0.004   0.221   0.003    
Sun Life Financial, Inc.
MDS Inc. 0.156   0.192 0.156 0.154 0.102 0.238  0.008   0.009   0.008   0.008   0.097   0.008    
Corus Entertainment, Inc. 0.098   0.212 0.134 0.180 0.067 0.201  0.029   0.051   0.028   0.042   0.025   0.036    
Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd. 0.142   0.127 0.159 0.348 0.152 0.128  0.004   0.003   0.004   0.004   0.007   0.004    
TELUS Corporation 0.120   0.338 0.559 0.047 0.336  0.004   0.005   0.006   0.005   0.006   0.005    
Nexen, Inc. 0.100   0.163 0.100 0.163 0.018 0.134  0.009   0.005   0.009   0.005   0.009   0.005    
Enerplus Resources Fund***
Average 0.168   0.235 0.180 0.259 0.112 0.207 0.045  0.028  0.033  0.024  0.062  0.017   
Spread Spread**PIN PIN PIN* Spread
g g
Company [‐2,+2] [‐5,+5] [‐10,+10] [‐10,+250]
Celestica Inc.
Shaw Communications Inc. ‐0.002 0.156 0.242 0.024
NOVA Chemicals Corporation
CGI Group Inc. ‐0.204 ‐0.269 ‐0.204 ‐0.757
Brookfield Properties Corporation ‐0.045 ‐0.041 ‐0.075 ‐0.358
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. 0.031 0.040 0.083 ‐0.740
Gildan Activewear Inc. 0.046 ‐0.029 ‐0.124 ‐0.477
Manulife Financial Corp.
Sun Life Financial, Inc.
MDS Inc. 0.018 ‐0.006 ‐0.037 ‐0.341
Corus Entertainment, Inc. ‐0.033 ‐0.087 ‐0.047 ‐0.684
Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd. 0.042 ‐0.011 ‐0.019 ‐0.287
TELUS Corporation ‐0.027 0.033 ‐0.011 ‐0.615
Nexen, Inc. ‐0.025 ‐0.012 0.001 ‐0.364
Enerplus Resources Fund*** 0.014 0.007 ‐0.027 ‐0.287
Average ‐0.017 ‐0.020 ‐0.020 ‐0.444
** Arithmetic mean of monthly spread estimates
*** Prior to June of 2001, Enerplus Resources Fund traded under ERF.G.  Upon the merger with EnerMark, the symbol became ERF.UN.
Cumulative Abnormal Return §
* Arithmetic mean of monthly PIN estimates. For derivation and estimation algorithm of PIN, see Appendix A3.
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Table A.8: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
The PIN is the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara,
and Paperman (1996). The bid-ask spreads are defined as: 1. SPREADNYSE ≡
askNYSE − bidNYSE
(askNYSE + bidNYSE)/2
; and 2. SPREADTSX ≡ askTSX − bidTSX(askTSX + bidTSX)/2 . VOLUME is the log of total
daily trading volume. d is a differential measure defined for the estimates of each
quantity of interest. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric pair-wise
comparison test, following Wilcoxon (1945). The Wilcoxon test-statistic is defined
as: V0 ≡ ∑{(i,t)} 1{d(i,t)>0} ·ρit, where ρit is the rank of {|d(i, t)|}, and the coordinates (i, t)
denote each firm and each period, respectively.
Panel A: Cross-listing effect on the PIN on the TSX
[-3M,+3M] [-6M,+6M] Threshold
H0 PIN+3M = PIN−3M PIN+6M = PIN−6M PINafter = PINbefore
H1 PIN+3M > PIN−3M PIN+6M > PIN−6M PINafter > PINbefore
d PIN+3M − PIN−3M PIN+6M − PIN−6M PINafter − PINbefore
V0 33 14 30
p-value 0.01953 0.05282 0.05469
Panel B: Cross-listing effect on bid-ask spread on the TSX
[-3M,+3M] [-6M,+6M] Threshold
H0 SPREAD+3M = SPREAD−3M SPREAD+6M = SPREAD−6M SPREADafter = SPREADbefore
H1 SPREAD+3M < SPREAD−3M SPREAD+6M < SPREAD−6M SPREADafter < SPREADbefore
d SPREAD−3M − SPREAD+3M SPREAD−6M − SPREAD+6M SPREADbefore − SPREADafter
V0 45 48 72
p-value 0.34820 0.25740 0.05260
Panel C: Cross-listing effect on volume on the TSX
[-3M,+3M] [-6M,+6M] Threshold
H0 VOLUME+3M = VOLUME−3M VOLUME+6M = VOLUME−6M VOLUMEafter = VOLUMEbefore
H1 VOLUME+3M > VOLUME−3M VOLUME+6M > VOLUME−6M VOLUMEafter > VOLUMEbefore
d VOLUME+3M − VOLUME−3M VOLUME+6M − VOLUME−6M VOLUMEafter − VOLUMEbefore
V0 42 39 58
p-value 0.7293 0.6285 0.9433
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Table A.9: Fixed-effect panel regressions of abnormal returns of TSX-listed
stocks
12 TSX-listed firms cross-listed on the NYSE through the sample period: January 1,
1998 through December 31, 2000. For each firm (i) and in each month (t), 1. the
abnormal return (RETURNAB) is the monthly cumulative return, following Binder
(1998), using the S&P TSX Composite Index to obtain the market return; 2. PIN
is the monthly estimate of the probability of informed trading, following Easley,
Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996); 3. CROSS-LIST is a dummy variable which
equals one in the month of cross-listing on the NYSE, or zero otherwise; 4. SPREAD
is the monthly average relative quoted spread; 5. VOLUME is the monthly aver-
age of the log of daily total trading volume; and 6. VOLATILITY is the standard
deviation of daily returns multiplied by 250/12. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Newey and West (1987, 1994).
The numerical values in the parentheses below the estimates are t-statistics. ***, **,
and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided student-t tests at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in firm-months.
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Table A.9 (Continued)
RETURNAB = β0 + β1 PIN + β2 CROSS-LIST + β3 SPREAD + β4 VOLUME + β5 VOLATILITY
+ β6 PIN × CROSS-LIST + β7 SPREAD × CROSS-LIST
+ β8 VOLUME × CROSS-LIST + β9 VOLATILITY × CROSS-LIST + 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Intercept) 0.024 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.020 0.017 0.020
(1.636) (1.670) (1.652) (1.300) (1.148) (1.248)
pin −0.050 −0.037 −0.034 −0.065 −0.020 0.005
(−0.456) (−0.320) (−0.294) (−0.566) (−0.175) (0.041)
cross-list Dummy −0.035∗ −0.037∗ −0.037∗ −0.028 −0.024 −0.025
(−1.886) (−1.911) (−1.898) (−1.447) (−1.278) (−1.297)
spread −0.280 −0.281 −0.296 −0.548
(−0.356) (−0.355) (−0.382) (−0.559)
volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.204) (−0.570) (1.491) (1.427)
volatility −0.124∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.073
(−3.185) (−0.969) (−0.913)
pin×cross-list −0.255∗ −0.264∗ −0.266∗ −0.251∗ −0.306∗∗ −0.336∗∗
(−1.716) (−1.747) (−1.754) (−1.686) (−2.056) (−2.138)
spread×cross-list 0.874
(0.544)
volume×cross-list 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗
(−2.013) (−1.957)
volatility×cross-list −0.073 −0.077
(−0.805) (−0.834)
No. of Obs. 218 218 218 218 218 218
Adj. R2 0.039 0.035 0.031 0.071 0.086 0.079
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Figure A.1: Monthly estimates of PIN on TSX and NYSE
The PIN is the probability of informed trading, following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara,
and Paperman (1996). Figure A.1 shows the average monthly PIN of the sample
firms co-listed on the TSX and the NYSE. The annual estimates for the PIN on the
TSX are {0.242, 0.213, 0.206} in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively, while the corre-
sponding estimates for the NYSE are {0.204, 0.212, 0.196}, over the same period.
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Panel A: Initial shock from the ask price on the NYSE
Panel B: Initial shock from the ask price on the TSX
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Panel C: Initial shock from the bid price on the NYSE
Panel D: Initial shock from the bid price on the TSX
Figure A.2: Impulse response function plots: cross-border responses of
quote changes
Each of the above four consecutive impulse response function plots of Aibiti Con-
solidate (co-listed on the TSX and on the NYSE) specifies the source of innovation
by two standard deviations. The quotes on the NYSE rarely affect the quotes on
the TSX. To the contrary, positive increases in ask and bid prices on the TSX are
followed by changes in ask and bid prices on the NYSE, respectively.
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Figure A.3: Cross-listing effect on the PIN on the TSX, six-month ([-
3M,+3M]) window
Above scatter plot describes various coordinates of the PIN on the TSX before (hor-
izontal axis) and after (vertical axis) NYSE-listing. A coordinate in the upper 45◦-
line region denotes a rise in the PIN, whereas one in the lower region a decline.
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Figure A.4: Cross-listing effect on the PIN on the TSX, twelve-month ([-
6M,+6M]) window
Above scatter plot describes various coordinates of the PIN on the TSX before (hor-
izontal axis) and after (vertical axis) NYSE-listing. A coordinate in the upper 45◦-
line region denotes a rise in the PIN, whereas one in the lower region a decline.
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Figure A.5: Cross-listing effect on the PIN on the TSX, threshold monthly
Above scatter plot describes various coordinates of the PIN on the TSX before (hor-
izontal axis) and after (vertical axis) NYSE-listing. A coordinate in the upper 45◦-
line region denotes a rise in the PIN, whereas one in the lower region a decline.
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A.3 PIN estimation algorithm
The PIN estimation algorithm is based on a symmetric Poisson intensity η for
arrivals of both uninformed buyers and sellers. Information events occur at the
market open with a probability α and, on a realization of such event, informed
traders who arrive with an intensity µ perceive a binary signal with a probability
either δ ≡ P {share price falls} or 1 − δ = P {share price rises}.
The probability of informed trading (PIN) is the relative degree of private
information (adverse selection) weighed on a randomly chosen transaction ex-
ecuted by an informed trader
PIN ≡ αµ
E
[
B(uy) + S(ell)
] = αµ
αµ + ηB + ηS
=
αµ
αµ + 2 η
,
assuming symmetric intensity in uninformed trader arrivals, either buyers or
sellers (see Figure A.6). Empirically, a trade is considered buyer-initiated if it
is higher than the five-second earlier mid-quote, or seller-initiated if lower (Lee
and Ready (1991)).
I adopt a log-likelihood factorization from Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu (2008)
as follows
L ≡ ln P
(
{Bt, S t}Tt=1 |α, δ, η, µ
)
=
T∑
t=1
[−2 η + M ln (x) + (Bt + S t) ln (µ + η)]
+
T∑
t=1
ln
[
α (1 − δ) exp (−µ) xS t−Mt + α δ exp (−µ) xBt−Mt + (1 − α) xBt+S t−Mt
]
,
where 1. Mt ≡ min(Bt ,S t)+max(Bt ,S t)2 ; and 2. x ≡ ηµ+ η . Thus, the parameters are
estimated by maximum likelihood method such that
Θˆ ≡
(
αˆ, δˆ, ηˆ, µˆ
)
= arg max
Θ
{
L | (η, µ) > 0, (α, δ) ∈ [0, 1]2
}
,
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hence the resulting PIN estimator is
P̂IN =
αˆ µˆ
αˆ µˆ + 2 ηˆ
.
Figure A.6: Derivation of PIN
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A.4 Information shares of stock exchanges
Consider a Canadian cross-listed pair (pT, pN) traded on both the TSX (T) and the
NYSE (N). The time series of the pair has a common efficient price1 (mt) such that
 pT,tpN,t
 =
 11
mt +
 cT qT,tcN qN,t
 ,
where cT and cN, and qT and qN are market-specific cost coefficients and their
associated trade volumes, respectively. Trade directions in the two markets may
be contemporaneously associated as
Var

 qT,tqN,t

 =
 1 ρqρq 1
 .
An attractive trait of the common efficient price is that the securities with
same underlying assets traded on distinct exchanges are linked by no-arbitrage
condition in an equilibrium. An implied-vector moving average (VMA) formu-
lation for the differences of prices is ∆pT,t∆pN,t
 =
 T,tN,t
 +
 qT,tqN,t
 =
 θTT θTNθNT θNN

 T,t−1N,t−1
 ,
then
Et
 pT,t+1pN,t+1
 =
 pT,tpN,t
 +
 θTT θTNθNT θNN

 T,t−1N,t−1
 ,
1A security price time-series
(
{mt}∞t=0
)
is efficient if, by definition, the conditional expectation
of the first-order difference is zero. In other words, an efficient price is unpredictable given the
presently available information. Equivalently, the increment of the price follows a martingale
difference sequence: mt = mt−1 + ut ⇒ E
(
∆mt | {ms−1}ts=1
)
= E
(
ut | {ms−1}ts=1
)
= 0. See Lee, White,
and Granger (1993).
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thus
Et
 pT,t+1pN,t+1
 − Et−1
 pT,tpN,t
 =
 ∆pT,t∆pN,t
 +
 θTT θTNθNT θNN

 ∆T,t−1∆N,t−1
 .
given that the two prices share the same efficient underlying price
(1 + θTT, θTN) = (θNT, 1 + θNN) .
Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit
root test is conducted to each daily-price time series of the 56 TSX-NYSE cross-
listed pairs with appropriate lag length, per Akaike (1974), to verify first-order
integration (I(1)). Applying Johansen’s (1991) either trace test or eigen-value
test yielded one “cointegrating”2 equation for each TSX-NYSE pair.
As a result, an econometric impasse is that since the cross-listed pairs are
cointegrated, a vector moving average (VMA) representation cannot be recov-
ered by Sims’s (1980) vector autoregressive (VAR) structural formulation. Subse-
quently, in the absence of accounting for sources of shocks to fragmented shares,
decomposing exchange-specific relative contribution to price discovery of the
TSX-NYSE pairs poses an unwieldy task.
A breakthrough is introduced by Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and
Yoo (1987), and Hasbrouck (1995) adopts their error correction model (ECM) to
arrive at the “information share”: the percentage share of an exchange in price
discovery of shares whose orders are executed from many markets. The vector
error correction model (VECM) for the cointegrated trade-level quote prices is
∆pt = φ(L)∆pt + γ (α − zt−1) + t,
2Security prices are cointegrated if there exists a linear combination of the non-stationary
prices that can be toned stationary. A time series is strongly stationary if its probability distribu-
tion is time-invariant, and weakly stationary if up to its second moments: mean, variance, and
covariance.
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where 1. φ(L)∆pt are vector autoregressive terms; 2. γ is a vector of cointegrat-
ing coefficients; 3. α > 0 is a vector of long-run cross-border bid-ask dollar
spreads; and 4. zt is a vector of cross-border dollar spreads in ask
(
paT,t, p
a
N,t
)
and
bid
(
pbT,t, p
b
N,t
)
prices on the TSX and the NYSE, respectively, as:
zt ≡

1 −1 0 0
1 0 −1 0
1 0 0 −1


paT,t
paN,t
pbT,t
pbN,t

=

paT,t − paN,t
paT,t − pbT,t
paT,t − pbN,t
 .
A resulting VMA generalization is ∆pt = Θ(L) t, where Ω ≡ Var(t). Define
σ2ω ≡ βΩ β′, where β = (βT, βN) = (1 + θTT, θTN) = (θNT, 1 + θNN). According to
Hasbrouck (1995, 2007),
1. if Ω is diagonal, the information share of a market i (= T, N) is defined as
ISi ≡ β
2
i Var(i,t)
σ2ω
which is market i’s proportional contribution to price discovery of a cross-
listed pair.
2. If Ω is non-diagonal, the lower and upper bounds of information share can
be obtained by re-ordering the sources of innovation (shock) with orthog-
onalized impulse response functions following Hasbrouck (2007). Given
four quote prices
(
paT,t, p
a
N,t, p
b
T,t, p
b
N,t
)
, there are 24 (= 4!) orderings in terms of
Cholesky exogeneity. In other words, for each TSX-NYSE pair, there are 24
pairs of information shares of the TSX and the NYSE, respectively. Averag-
ing across varying exogeneity reduces them to a single pair of information
shares for each cross-listed pair.
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The estimated information shares for 56 cross-listed pairs are listed in Ta-
ble A.1. The impulse response function plots of bid and ask quotes for Abitibi
Consolidated, Inc., are shown in Figure A.2. Each of the four consecutive charts
specifies the source of innovation by two standard deviations. The quotes on
the NYSE rarely affect the quotes on the TSX. To the contrary, positive increases
in ask and bid prices on the TSX are followed by changes in ask and bid prices
on the NYSE, respectively. This pattern does not hold for all cross-listed pairs,
and the degree to which an exchange responds to the other side is reflected in
the relative magnitude of information share.
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A.5 Proofs
From the model in Subsection 1.2, I have
β0i =
υ
1 + r
− yi
(1 + r)(ωIT + ω
U
T )
,
βSi =
1
(1 + r)(ωIi + ω
U
i )
{
ωIi
(
τ
τ + τυ
)
+ ωUi
(
φiτ
φiτ + τυ
)}
,
βYi =
ωIi {τ/(τ + τυ)}
(1 + r)(ωIi + ω
U
i )
{
ωIi
(
τ
τ + τυ
)
+ ωUi
(
φiτs
φiτ + τυ
)}
,
βAi =
1
(1 + r)
(
ωIi + ω
U
i
) ,
where φi ≡ pi
2
i η
2 τs τy
1+pi2i η
2 τ τy
, ωIi ≡ pii η (τ + τυ), ωUi ≡ (1 − pii) η (φiτ + τυ), for all i =
T(SX),N(YSE). For brevity, I omit the exchange subscript i in the following
proofs.
Proposition 1. ∂β0(pi)/∂pi > 0, for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Note that ∂β0(pi)/∂(ωI + ωU) > 0, and
∂(ωI + ωU)
∂pi
=
η τ(
τyτpi2η2 + 1
)2 (−τyτpi2η2 + 2τyτpiη2 + 1) ,
where the quadratic solutions for −τyτpi2η2 + 2τyτpiη2 + 1 = 0 are
pi = 1
ητyτ
(√
τyτ + η2τ2yτ
2
 + ητyτ
)
> 1,
pi = − 1
ητyτ
(√
τyτ + η2τ2yτ
2
 − ητyτ
)
< 0,
thus pi ∈ [0, 1] implies −τyτpi2η2 + 2τyτspiη2 + 1 > 0, hence ∂(ωI + ωU)/∂pi > 0.
Therefore,
∂β0(pi)/∂pi =
{
∂β0(pi)/∂(ωI + ωU)
}
{∂(ωI + ωU)/∂pi} > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
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Proposition 2. ∂βS (pi)/∂pi > 0, for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. An analogous argument to the proof of Proposition 1 leads to
∂βS (pi)
∂pi
=
(τυτ)
(
−τyτpi2η2 + 2τyτpiη2 + 1
)
(
τypi2η2τ2 + τυτypi
2η2τ + piτ + τυ
)2 > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 3. ∂βY(pi)/∂pi < 0, for some large pi.
Proof. A direct partial differentiation gives
∂βY(pi)
∂pi
= −
(τ/η)
(
pi2η4τ2yτ
2
 + τυpi
2η4τ2yτ + 2piη
2τyτ + 2τυpiη2τy − τυη2τy + 1
)
(
τypi2η2τ2 + τυτypi
2η2τ + piτ + τυ
)2 ,
where the solutions for pi2η4τ2yτ2 + τυpi2η4τ2yτ + 2piη2τyτ + 2τυpiη2τy − τυη2τy + 1 = 0
are
pi = − 1
η2τyτ (τυ+τ )
{
τυ + τ +
√
τυ (τυ + τ)
(
η2τyτ + 1
)}
< 0,
pi = − 1
η2τyτ (τυ+τs)
{
τυ + τ −
√
τυ (τυ + τ)
(
η2τyτ + 1
)}
≶ 0 if τυη2τy ≶ 1.
Thus, if τυη2τy < 1, there exists some constant c ∈ [0, 1] such that ∂βY(pi)/∂pi ≷ 0
for pi ≶ c; and if τυη2τy > 1, then ∂βY(pi)/∂pi < 0 for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
∂βY(pi)/∂pi < 0 for some large pi.
Proposition 4. ∂βA(pi)/∂pi < 0, for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Note that ∂βA(pi)/∂(ωI + ωU) > 0 and, from the proof of Proposition 1,
∂
(
ωI + ωU
)
/∂pi > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
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Therefore, ∂βA(pi)/∂pi =
{
∂βA(pi)/∂(ωI + ωU)
}
{∂(ωI + ωU)/∂pi} > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 5. There exists no arbitrage in an equilibrium if pN − pT = β0N − β0T.
Proof. The prices of a TSX-NYSE cross-listed pair are, respectively,
pT = β0T + β
S
T ∆S − βYT ∆YT − βAT xAT ,
pN = β0N + β
S
N∆S − βYN∆YN − βANxAN.
In a disequilibrium, arbitrageurs’ profit in excess of the required cross-listing
dollar premium is
(pN − pT) −
(
β0N − β0T
)
=
(
βST − βSN
)
∆S + βYN∆YN − βYT ∆YT − βANxAT + βAT xAN,
then given perfect hedging (µ ≡ xAT = −xAN), arbitrageurs’ short (long) position
on the TSX (NYSE) is
µ =
(
β0N − β0T
)
− (pN − pT) +
(
βST − βSN
)
∆S + βYN∆YN − βYT ∆YT
βAN + β
A
T
,
thus, in an equilibrium (∆S = ∆YT = ∆YN = 0), the no-arbitrage (µ = 0) condition
must be
pN − pT = β0N − β0T.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 OF APPENDIX
B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Sovereign corporate governance measures: cross-border target
countries
 Country AD AS SMCTG  Country AD AS SMCTG
 Argentina 2 45 4.062 Jordan 1 4.352
 Australia 4 75 4.625 Kenya 2 2.728
 Austria 3 54 2.797 Luxembourg 2 4.974
 Belgium 3 61 4.208 Malaysia 5 76 5.000
 Bolivia 2 2.747 Mexico 3 60 3.086
 Brazil 5 54 3.648 Netherlands 3 64 4.881
 Canada 4 74 4.665 New Zealand 4 70 3.691
 Chile 4 52 4.496 Norway 4 74 3.681
 China 1 3.768  Peru 4 38 3.127
 Colombia 3 50 2.660 Philippines 4 65 3.871
 Croatia 3 2.803 Poland 2 2.815
 Czech  Republic 3.006 Portugal 3 36 3.833
 Denmark 4 62 4.071 Romania 5 1.705
 Ecuador 2 1.758 Russia 4 3.503
 Finland 4 77 5.177 Singapore 5 78 5.105
 France 4 69 4.494 South Africa 5 70 5.049
 Germany 4 62 4.002 South Korea 5 62 3.991
 Greece 2 55 4.515 Spain 5 64 4.381
 Hong  Kong 5 69 5.889 Sweden 4 83 4.721
 Hungary 2 3.178 Switzerland 3 68 5.517
 India 5 57 3.520 Taiwan 3 65 4.624
 Indonesia 4 3.207 Thailand 4 64 3.802
 Ireland 5 4.214 Turkey 3 51 3.564
 Israel 4 64 3.970 United Kingdom 5 78 5.061
 Italy 2 62 3.967 United States 3 71 4.957
 Japan 5 65 4.237 Venezuela 1 40 1.705
Accounting Standards (AS) is from La Porta, et al. (1998), and Antidirector Rights (AD)—which
proxies for the degree of shareholder protection—is from Djankov, et al. (2008). As a relative measure
of country-specific equity market development, Stock Market Capitalization to GDP (SMCTG) is
suggested by Djankov, et al. (2008). 
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Table B.2: Panel regression analyses of U.S. domestic target returns
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Table B.3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of foreign targets and U.S.
acquirers
Panel A: Sample means of CARs with Wilcoxon-test p-values—cross-border deals
CAR H1 : CAR > 0 ACAR H1 : ACAR < 0
[+2,-2] 0.137 0.000 -0.0053 0.000
[-5,+5] 0.140 0.000 -0.0073 0.002
[-10,+10] 0.184 0.000 -0.0056 0.029
Panel B: Correlation matrix
CAR[±5] CAR[±10] ACAR[±2] ACAR[±5] ACAR[±10]
CAR[±2] 0.847 *** 0.732 *** -0.056 *** -0.018 ** -0.041 **
CAR[±5] 0.846 *** -0.083 *** -0.050 *** -0.065 ***
CAR[±10] -0.063 *** -0.046 *** -0.044 ***
ACAR[±2] 0.764 ** 0.557 **
ACAR[±5] 0.726 ***
In Panel A, cross-border acquiree returns (CARs) are cumulative abnormal returns of cross-border targets
through 5-day, 11-day, and 21-day event study windows. Bidder cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) are
of the U.S. acquirers through the same respective periods. Wilcoxon test is a statistical significance test for
nonparametric pairwise comparison. In Panel B, CAR[±d] is the cumulative abnormal returns of cross-
border targets through (2d+1)-day event study window. ACAR[±d] is the cumulative abnormal returns of
U.S. acquirers through the same period. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided
tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table B.4: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of foreign targets
Panel A: Representative statistics
Mean Median Standard dev. No. of deals
CAR[-2,+2]|dict 0.155 0.029 0.575 235
CAR[-2,+2]|demo 0.121 0.015 0.267 243
CAR[-5,+5]|dict 0.141 0.044 0.361 235
CAR[-5,+5]|demo 0.127 0.013 0.277 243
CAR[-10,+10]|dict 0.217 0.054 1.418 236
CAR[-10,+10]|demo 0.151 0.011 0.341 243
Panel B: H1 : CAR|dict > CAR|demo—cross-border deals
Wilcoxon p-value
H1: CAR[-2,+2]|dict > CAR[-2,+2]|demo 0.0661
H1: CAR[-5,+5]|dict > CAR[-5,+5]|demo 0.0358
H1: CAR[-10,+10]|dict > CAR[-10,+10]|demo 0.0194
Panel C: Cross-border acquiree returns (CARs) in 100% acquisitions
Mean Median Standard dev. No. of deals
CAR[-2,+2]|dict 0.213 0.117 0.290 84
CAR[-2,+2]|demo 0.239 0.122 0.366 82
CAR[-5,+5]|dict 0.232 0.154 0.342 84
CAR[-5,+5]|demo 0.245 0.136 0.363 82
CAR[-10,+10]|dict 0.233 0.174 0.272 84
CAR[-10,+10]|demo 0.298 0.179 0.432 82
Panel D: H1 : CAR|demo > CAR|dict in 100% acquisitions—cross-border deals
Wilcoxon p-value
H1: CAR[-2,+2]|demo > CAR[-2,+2]|dict 0.486
H1: CAR[-5,+5]|demo > CAR[-5,+5]|dict 0.404
H1: CAR[-10,+10]|demo > CAR[-10,+10]|dict 0.493
We follow the classification of "dictators" by Masulis et al. (2007) if the acquirer has a G Index
score–number of ATPs–higher than or equal to ten, or "democrats" if less than or equal to nine.
Gompers, et al. (2003) previously classified dictators with firms with more than or equal to 14 ATPs and
democrats with firms with less than or equal to five ATPs. CAR[±d]|dict is the cumulative abnormal
returns of cross-border targets acquired by dictatorial U.S. acquirers through (2d+1)-day event study
window. CAR[±d]|demo is that of democratic U.S. acquirers.
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Table B.5: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of foreign targets and U.S.
acquirers
Panel A: Sample means of CARs per number of ATPs—cross-border deals
G Index CAR ACAR CAR ACAR CAR ACAR
2 0.061 -0.309 -0.022 -0.354 0.140 -0.239
3 -0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.042 -0.001 0.035
4 0.091 0.034 0.088 0.048 0.116 -0.012
5 0.110 -0.012 0.113 -0.009 0.177 -0.018
6 0.070 0.002 0.087 -0.004 0.124 0.005
7 0.153 -0.017 0.160 -0.005 0.180 0.029
8 0.092 -0.018 0.063 -0.019 0.061 -0.024
9 0.109 -0.012 0.132 -0.009 0.147 -0.004
10 0.137 -0.020 0.158 -0.023 0.140 -0.017
11 0.103 -0.002 0.113 0.009 0.110 0.002
12 0.123 -0.005 0.118 0.006 0.123 0.009
13 0.175 -0.004 0.121 -0.002 0.127 -0.002
14 0.070 0.023 0.066 0.022 0.067 0.052
15 0.054 -0.017 0.040 0.051 0.047 0.035
16 0.069 0.023 0.306 0.027 0.329 0.032
18 -0.002 -0.003 0.008 -0.010 -0.007 0.057
19 -0.001 -0.065 0.087 0.047 0.093 0.093
Panel B: Cross-border CAR of foreign targets against G Index of U.S. acquirers
Variable Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Intercept 0.106 ** -0.054 0.106 ** -0.068 0.144 ** 0.001
G Index 0.000 0.040 *** 0.000 0.037 *** 0.000 0.036
(G Index)2 -0.002 *** -0.002 ** -0.001
F-statistic 0.018 8.381 *** 1.442 5.362 ** 0.002 1.351
Adj. R2 -0.065 0.480 -0.065 0.353 -0.067 0.042
Panel C: Foreign acquisition announcement returns of U.S. Acquirers against their G Index
Variable Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Intercept -0.067 ** -0.185 ** -0.086 * -0.177 * -0.082 *** -0.113 *
G Index 0.004 ** 0.034 *** 0.007 ** 0.031 ** 0.008 *** 0.016 **
(G Index)2 -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.000
F-statistic 1.419 3.125 * 3.257 * 2.608 9.673 *** 4.874 **
Adj. R2 0.025 0.210 0.124 0.167 0.352 0.326
In Panel A, G Index is the number of ATPs of U.S. acquirers provided by Gompers, et al. (2003). CAR[±d] is the
cumulative abnormal returns of cross-border targets through (2d+1)-day event study window. ACAR[±d] is the
cumulative abnormal returns of U.S. acquirers through the same period. In Panel B, the sample consists of 599
completed cross-border takeover deals (listed in SDC) for public foreign targets by U.S. acquirers covered by the
IRRC antitakeover provision database between October 31, 1984, and October 15, 2007. The dependent variable is
the sample means of cross-border target's 5-day, 11-day, 21-day windows of cross-cumulative abnormal returns
around announcement dates. Panel C shows the same results for foreign takeover announcement returns made by
U.S. acquirers. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Newey and
West (1987, 1994). ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-side tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. The G Index (Gompers, et al. (2003)) is the number of antitakeover provisions of U.S.
acquirers.
[-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10]
[-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10]
[-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10]
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Table B.6: Sample means of CARs and ACARs by U.S. acquirers’ and target
countries’ corporate governance
Panel A: Sample means of CARs by U.S. acquirers' and target countries' corporate governance
CAR[±2]|dict 0.043 ** 0.166 *** 0.013 0.173 *** 0.012 ** 0.179 ***
CAR[±2]|demo 0.048 ** 0.131 *** 0.030 0.134 *** 0.018 0.135 ***
CAR[±5]|dict 0.048 ** 0.151 *** 0.007 0.159 *** 0.010 0.164 ***
CAR[±5]|demo 0.053 * 0.136 *** 0.043 0.139 *** 0.022 0.141 ***
CAR[±10]|dict 0.041 ** 0.235 ** -0.006 0.246 ** 0.001 0.254 **
CAR[±10]|demo 0.119 ** 0.155 *** 0.088 * 0.160 *** 0.032 0.167 ***
Panel B: H1: CAR|dict > CAR|demo—p-values of Wilcoxon difference tests
CAR[±2] 0.412 0.114 0.713 0.080 0.162 0.089
CAR[±5] 0.243 0.094 0.671 0.054 0.272 0.061
CAR[±10] 0.571 0.043 0.483 0.042 0.103 0.062
Panel C: H1: CAR|High > CAR|Low—p-values of Wilcoxon difference tests
AD AS SMTCG
CAR[±2]|dict 0.041 0.000 0.000
CAR[±2]|demo 0.058 0.006 0.001
CAR[±5]|dict 0.073 0.000 0.000
CAR[±5]|demo 0.122 0.020 0.003
CAR[±10]|dict 0.015 0.000 0.000
CAR[±10]|demo 0.407 0.076 0.006
Panel D: Sample means of ACARs by U.S. acquirers' and target countries' corporate governance
ACAR[±2]|dict 0.007 -0.010 ** -0.001 -0.008 * 0.000 -0.009 **
ACAR[±2]|demo 0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.007
ACAR[±5]|dict -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
ACAR[±5]|demo 0.011 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.005 -0.006
ACAR[±10]|dict -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.005
ACAR[±10]|demo -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.010
AD AS SMCTG
Low High Low High Low High
HighLow HighLowHighLow
AD AS SMCTG
AD AS SMCTG
Low High Low High Low High
We follow the classification of "dictators" by Masulis, et al. (2007) if the acquirer has a G Index
score—number of ATPs—higher than or equal to ten, or "democrats" if less than or equal to nine. Gompers,
et al. (2003) previously classified dictators with firms with more than or equal to 14 ATPs and democrats
with firms with less than or equal to five ATPs. In Panel A, CAR[±d]|dict is the cumulative abnormal returns
of cross-border targets acquired by dictatorial U.S. acquirers through (2d+1)-day event study window.
CAR[±d]|demo is that of democratic U.S. acquirers. In Panel B, ACAR is the cumulative abnormal returns of
U.S. acquirers with analogous definitions. Accounting Standards (AS) is from La Porta, et al. (1998), and
Antidirector Rights (AD)—which proxies the degree of shareholder protection—is from Djankov, et al.
(2008). As a relative measure of country-specific equity market development, Stock Market Capitalization to
GDP (SMCTG) is suggested by Djankov, et al. (2008). Any "high" dummy variable equals one if a country's
sovereign corporate governance score is higher than the median, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * stand for
statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table B.7: Panel regression analyses of cross-border target returns
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B.2 Figure
Panel A: U.S. domestic deals
Panel B: U.S. cross-border deals
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Figure B.1: Sample distribution by announcement year: U.S. domestic
deals
This figures provide summary statistics of 1456 and 499 completed deals of U.S.
acquirers’ domestic and foreign takeovers, respectively, as given by SDC between
1990 and 2007. All firms are covered by the IRRC ATP database.
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Panel A: Foreign target returns against U.S. acquirers' G Index
Panel B: U.S. acquirer returns against their G Index
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Figure B.2: Cumulative abnormal return plots of cross-border targets and
U.S. acquirers
Figures in Panel A plot foreign targets’ CARs against their U.S. acquirers’ G Index
over three event windows, [-2,+2], [-5,+5], and [-10,+10], respectively. Figures in
Panel B plot U.S. acquirers’ CARs (ACARs) against their G Index over the same
respective event periods. The G Index is the number of ATPs per Gompers et al.
(2003).
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Table C.1: Summary statistics of ADR pairs
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Table C.2: Profiles of selected Asia-Pacific ADR-pairs
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Table C.3: Asia-Pacific Securities Exchanges
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Table C.4: H0 : θlater(t) = θearlier(t) vs. H1 : θlater(t) > θearlier(t)
The vertical labels are of later closings and the horizontal labels earlier.
6-7 hours 8-9 hours 10-11 hours
t0 32.246** 57.396** 44.534**
4-5 hours V0 1326 1326 1326
p-value 2.651×10−10 2.651×10−10 2.651×10−10
t0 25.189** 18.320**
6-7 hours V0 1326 1326
p-value 2.651×10−10 2.651×10−10
t0 7.078**
8-9 hours V0 1188
p-value 4.408×10−7
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Figure C.1: Percentage deviation from implied prices of ADR-
pairs—kernel density plots
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Figure C.2: Convergence speed parameters of ADR-pairs
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Figure C.3: Convergence speed by home countries
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Figure C.4: Comparative dynamics of convergence speed
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Figure C.5: Convergence speed by home exchanges
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Figure C.6: Convergence speed by various listing types in the U.S.
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Figure C.7: Comparative dynamics of convergence speed by listing types
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Figure C.8: Comparative dynamics with respect to short sales
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Figure C.9: Comparative dynamics with respect to MSCI indices
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Figure C.10: Comparative dynamics with respect to time differences
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Figure C.11: Betas of home countries
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C.3 Nonparametric varying-coefficient model
Consider the following varying-coefficient model: yit = Xitβi(zit) + εit ∀ (i, t) ∈
[1, ...,N] × [1, ...,T ], where (1) yit is the dependent variable and Xit is a re-
gressor variable or vector; (2) βi(zit) is a coefficient function on the smooth-
ing variable zit; and (4) εit is the error term that follows a martingale
difference sequence adapted to the information algebra Ft = σ(Xit, zit).
Our objective is to estimate the coefficient function βi(zit) based on data
{(yit, Xit, zit) |(i, t) ∈ [1, ...,N] × [1, ...,T ]}.
Writing the model in compact form, for each i, we have Yi = Xiβi(zi) + εi,
where (1) Yi = (yi1, · · · , yiT )T is a T × 1 matrix; and (2) X is a T × q matrix. Using
the local linear kernel estimation method,1 we have β̂i(z) = (XTi WiXi)
−1XTi WiYi,
where (1) K(·) ≡ 1{|(·)|<1} ·
{
1 − (·)2
}
is a kernel of our choice; and (2) Wi is the
weighting matrix based on K((zit − z)/h).
An important extension of the above model is to allow some regressors to
behave linearly with the dependent variable. In this case, we arrive to a partially
varying-coefficient linear model , studied by Fan and Huang (2005). The model
is defined as follows: Y = Xa(U) + Zβ + ε, where (1) Y is the response variable;
(2) (U, X,Z) are the covariates; (3) ε is a martingale difference sequence adapted
to Ft = σ(U, X,Z); (4) a(U) is an unknown coefficient functions; and (5) β is a
constant parameter.
Fan and Huang (2005) provide a breakthrough in estimating the parameters
and the coefficient functions: β̂ = [ZT (I − S )T (I − S )Z]−1ZT (I − S )T (I − S )Y, where
(1) WuT = diag{Kh(u1 − u), · · · ,Kh(uT − u)} T×T ;
1See Fan and Yao (2003).
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(2) Du =

XT1 ,
u1−u
h X
T
1
...
XTT ,
uT−u
h X
T
T

T×2
; and (3) S =

[XT1 , 0]{DTu1Wu1Du1}−1DTu1Wu1
...
[XTT , 0]{DTuTWuTDuT }−1DTuTWuT

T×T.
After obtaining β̂, we can conduct a nonparametric estimation for the coeffi-
cient function a(U) as
â(U) =

[1, 0]{DTu1Wu1Du1}−1DTu1Wu1
...
[1, 0]{DTuTWuTDuT }−1DTuTWuT

T×T
(
Y − Zβ̂
)
T×1.
Finally, in order to alleviate the model error in the parametric specification,
our nonparametric extension2 from Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) is
D˜Ri(t) = αi + θi(t) D˜Ri(t − 1) +
1∑
j=−1
βUSj R
US
M (t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βHj R
H
M(t + j) +
1∑
j=−1
βFXj RFX(t + j) + εi(t),
where (1) θi(t) is the firm-specific intra-day convergence speed param-
eter which varies over time; the higher the absolute value of the
parameter to one, the lower the convergence speed; (2) D˜Ri(t) ≡{
PUSi (t− j˜)−PHi (t)
PHi (t)
: j˜ = argmin j
{PUSi (t− j)−PHi (t)PHi (t)  : j = 0, 1}} is the minimum of the rela-
tive price deviations of the same- and previous-calendar days ADRs
(
PUS
)
from
its underlying share
(
PH
)
in the home market, adjusted for the host-home ex-
change ratio and the foreign exchange rate (see Figure C.12)3; (3) RUSM (t+ j) is the
return on the U.S. market index; (4) RHM(t + j) is the return on the home market
2In the sprit of “Let the data reveal the fact...,” it is the first-known attempt in the cross-listed
shares literature.
3A conventional definition of relative spread would be DRi(t) ≡ P
US
i (t)−PHi (t)
PHi (t)
following Gagnon
and Karolyi (2004). D˜Ri(t) as defined above seeks to better capture the dynamic convergence
towards the parity. The reason for bringing the minimum spread definition is that the asyn-
chronous trading between the Asia-Pacific exchanges and the U.S. host exchanges will further
confound the true convergence of an ADR towards its implied value. Our definition may be
needless in synchronous trades as on Canadian and Mexican cross-listed shares.
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index; (5) RFX(t + j) is the return on foreign exchange rate at time t + j with ex-
change rates defined per U.S. dollar, that is a positive RFX implies a depreciation
in the home currency of the ADR.
Figure C.12: The definition of minimum relative spread D˜Ri(t)
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C.4 Hypothesis testing methods
When we test the significance of the difference between two regime-
dependent nonparametric estimates of time-varying parameters such that: H0 :
θregime 1(t) = θregime 2(t) vs. H1 : θregime 1(t) , θregime 2(t), our procedure is as fol-
lows: (1) obtain the difference over the time period, d(t) ≡ θ̂regime 1(t) − θ̂regime 2(t) ∀ t ∈
[01/01/03, 12/31/05], where θ̂regime j(t) ≡ ∑{i|regime j} θ̂i|regime j/| {i|regime j} |; (2) calcu-
late the standard error of the difference, s.e. (d(t)) ≡ σ (d(t)) /√# ({t}); and (3) test the
null t-statistic at a given significance level (α), t0 ≡
(
d(t) − 0
)
/s.e. (d(t)) ∼ tα (d f ) .
We also use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test4 as an alternate which is a nonpara-
metric test to compare the two samples. The estimators are assumed to follow
the same distribution if they are the results of a nonparametric method. The
Wilcoxon-test statistic is defined as V0 ≡ ∑{t} 1{d(t)>0} · ρt, where ρt is the rank of
{|d(t)|}{t}.
4See Wilcoxon (1945).
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